European transformation in the Middle East

Alghad - 13/04
Europe lives at the moment of a sharp gesuste strategy, which is imposed on it from turning its historical relationship with the United States, and from the escalation of threats from the east, especially Russia. This new reality causes Europeans to redefine their role in the world, by enhancing solid strength tools, and reducing dependence on Washington, without being easy or fast. But the road to European "strategic independence", as it aspires to Brussels, Paris and Berlin, is long and needs solid military and industrial infrastructure, expanding armies and updating armament systems. On the other hand, these plans deduct a large part of the budgets of European countries, which leads to an accelerated reduction in external economic aid, which weakens the soft European influence, especially in the Middle East and North Africa. Europe, which has been betting on decades of its financial and diplomatic influence, finds itself today in need of re -prioritization. It is - of course - cannot be spent on Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt and Gaza as it was previously, and it realizes that the Gulf states, Turkey and China have become more present in filling this void. In the Iranian file, Europe looks careful. It agrees with Washington and the Gulf states the necessity of preventing Tehran from having a nuclear weapon, but it is worried about a supposed American-Russian rapprochement that may marginalize its role. And Iran, in turn, has shed Russia with enlightenings targeting Ukraine, which is at the heart of the European security equation, and this forces Brussels to coordinate with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, without engaging in any direct military confrontation, especially in light of the European need to support Trump in the Ukraine file. In Syria, European visions differ from the American. While Trump declared that "Syria is not the problem of America", and he refused to reduce sanctions or provide aid at the Brussels Conference on the donors, European capitals continued to provide billions, and began to reopen communication channels with Damascus, motivated by a new wave of asylum than it is keen on "reconstruction" itself. In Gaza, where he turned the most hot event, Europe rejected the Trump plan to deport the population and hand over the administration to American investors, and preferred to support the Egyptian initiative by returning the sector to the Palestinian Authority. But this does not hide that Europe is forced to choose between many files with less resources, which means changing priorities from one country to another, and while Washington's appetite declines in the region, Israel shows intention to include parts of Gaza and the West Bank, indications of tension between Tel Aviv and some European capitals increases, especially in light of the escalation of calls within Europe to impose economic measures on Israel. Today, Europe is preparing to market its new military industries in the Middle East, even if it collides with the accounts of Israel and America, it is a new Europe, in a less romantic and more pragmatic form, moving between the necessities of deterrence, the limited resources, the desire of influence, and the confrontation of its sharp divisions by rearranging the interests of gathering and not separating within the fragile union.
Europe lives at the moment of a sharp gesuste strategy, which is imposed on it from turning its historical relationship with the United States, and from the escalation of threats from the east, especially Russia. This new reality pushes the Europeans to redefine their role in the world, by strengthening solid strength tools, and reducing dependence on Washington, without being ea...
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