Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 12, 2025
Davit Gasparyan, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan
January 12, 2025, 2:30 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on January 12. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 13 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
The Ukrainian General staff reported on January 12 that Ukrainian forces conducted a high-precision airstrike on the command post of Russia's 2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA] (Central Military District) in Novohrodivka, Donetsk Oblast.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the operation is part of a broader series of Ukrainian strikes targeting command posts of Russian forces operating in the Donetsk direction. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 8 and 10 that Ukrainian forces struck the command posts of the Russian 8th CAA (Southern Military District) in occupied Khartsyzk, Donetsk Oblast, and the 3rd Army Corps [AC] (Central Military District) in occupied Svitlodarsk, Donetsk Oblast, respectively.[2] Ukrainian strikes on tactical command posts and positions located near the frontline, such as the strike against Novohrodivka, are likely intended to disrupt Russian tactical activity and directly complicate Russian command and control (C2) on the battlefield. Ukrainian strikes against main command posts further in the Russian rear, such as the January 8 strike on the Russian 8th CAA post, are likely aimed at degrading broader Russian logistics and operational planning efforts, which could have impacts on Russia's ability to conduct its military operations in western Donetsk Oblast. ISW has observed that the 2nd CAA is currently leading Russian operations south of Pokrovsk, that the 3rd AC is operating near Chasiv Yar, and that the 8th CAA is leading Russian efforts near Kurakhove.[3]
South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) confirmed that Ukrainian forces captured two North Korean soldiers during combat operations in Kursk Oblast on January 9.[4] The NIS told Agence-France-Presse (AFP) on January 12 that one of the captured North Korean soldiers initially believed that North Korean authorities had sent him to Russia for training but that he realized upon arrival that he would be engaged in combat - in line with recent statements from Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.[5] One of the captured North Korean soldiers also stated that they suffered food and water shortages for several days before their capture and that North Korean forces have suffered significant losses.[6]
Key Takeaways:
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activitie...
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