Africa File, January 16, 2025: SAF Advances in Central Sudan en Route to Khartoum; Canadian Gold Mining Company Leaves Mali with Russia on Standby; JNIM’s Deadliest-Ever Attack in Benin; DRC Launches Counteroffensive Against Rwandan-backed M23
Authors: Liam Karr and Kathryn Tyson
CTP is delaying the next Africa File by one day until Friday, January 24, due to Martin Luther King Jr. Day and Inauguration Day in the United States. CTP will publish the subsequent Africa File as usual the week of January 30.
Data Cutoff: January 16, 2025, at 10 a.m.
The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.
Key Takeaways:
Sudan. The SAF recaptured Wad Madani from the RSF on January 11, an operationally significant district capital in central Sudan that will help to set conditions for the SAF to achieve its strategic objective of retaking the Sudanese capital, Khartoum. The capture of Wad Madani is part of the Sudanese Armed Forces’ (SAF) effort to encircle the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Khartoum and ultimately dislodge the RSF from the capital. The recapture of Khartoum is a strategic objective for the SAF that supports the SAF’s grand strategic aim of establishing itself as the only legitimate power in Sudan. The SAF capture of Khartoum could affect external support for the SAF and RSF from Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, respectively.
Mali. The Canadian gold mining company Barrick Gold temporarily suspended mining operations in Mali, and Russia is poised to fill any potential void. Barrick’s decision is the result of a multiyear Russian-supported campaign to pressure Western gold mining companies out of Mali. Russia used this same strategy to secure access to uranium sites in neighboring Niger after the Nigerien junta pressured Western companies to suspend operations. Increased Russian access to mining in the Sahel will boost the Russian economy and mitigate Western efforts to economically isolate Russia.
Benin. Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate JNIM carried out its deadliest-ever attack against Beninese forces in early January. The attack highlights the challenges Beninese forces face given the strong insurgent support zones across the border in Burkina Faso and Niger that enable major attacks in northern Benin. The growing strength of Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) in Benin challenges US efforts in the Gulf of Guinea to contain the Sahelian Salafi-jihadi insurgency.
DRC. The Congolese army and government-aligned forces have launched a counteroffensive against Rwandan-backed M23 rebels to reverse M23 advances toward two district capitals and regain control over key mineral-rich areas and supply lines in eastern DRC. Rwanda has continued to insist that the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) negotiate with M23, a nonstarter demand that will continue to hinder peace talks between the DRC and Rwanda.
Assessments:
Sudan
Sudan. The SAF recaptured Wad Madani from the RSF on January 11, an operationally significant district capital in central Sudan that will help set conditions for the SAF to achieve its strategic objective of retaking the Sudanese capital, Khartoum. Wad Madani is about 100 miles south of the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, in Gezira State. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) captured Wad Madani in December 2023 and used the city to supply its forces in Khartoum and elsewhere in central Sudan.[1] The RSF also used Wad Madani as a gateway to extend control over large areas of farmland and villages and threaten Sudan’s southeastern states.[2] The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) quickly advanced toward Wad Madani in January 2025 against little resistance. The SAF set conditions to retake the district capital with an offensive in central Sudan that began in October 2024 and retook several key RSF positions in Gezira and Sennar States.[3] Unspecified sources told Egyptian media that RSF fighters fled to the peripheries of Gezira State and north toward Khartoum.[4] The RSF commander acknowledged the loss of Wad Madani and called on RSF fighters to regroup.[5]
Figure 1. Sudan Army Advances in Eastern States: October 2024
Source: Sudan War Monitor.
Figure 2. The SAF Recaptures Wad Madani and Advances Toward Khartoum
Source: Kathryn Tyson
The capture of Wad Madani is part of the SAF’s effort to encircle the RSF in Khartoum and ultimately dislodge the RSF from the capital. The SAF launched an offensive against the RSF in Khartoum in September 2024 to relieve several besieged units in the city.[6] SAF units attacked from the west bank of the Nile in Omdurman, captured several key bridges, and established beachheads on the east side of the river.[7] These gains put SAF forces across the Nile and within four miles of besieged SAF positions around the SAF headquarters.[8] The SAF continued to advance in some areas of Khartoum in late 2024 and early January.[9] The RSF continues to hold most of Khartoum and parts of southern Omdurman on the west side of the Nile, while the SAF controls some small areas in Khartoum and northern Omdurman.[10]
Figure 3. Sudan Army Seizes Khartoum Bridgehead in Surprise Attack: September 26, 2024
Source: Sudan War Monitor.
The SAF is setting conditions to open a southern front toward Khartoum with the capture of Wad Madani. The SAF’s capture of Wad Madani severs RSF supply lines between Khartoum and central Sudan, allows the SAF to secure its own supply routes to the capital, and allows the SAF to pressure Khartoum from the south.[11] The SAF has already advanced north from Wad Madani toward Khartoum and captured several villages on a major highway that links the two cities.[12] An unspecified senior military officer told Egyptian media that that SAF units will advance toward Khartoum along three main routes to surround the capital from the east, west, and south.[13] The officer added that the SAF will work to clear RSF fighters from northern and western Gezira State to prevent the RSF from regrouping.[14]
The recapture of Khartoum is a strategic objective for the SAF that supports the SAF’s grand strategic aim of establishing itself as the only legitimate power in Sudan. SAF control over Khartoum would be a political victory that would boost the SAF’s claim to be Sudan’s only legitimate force. SAF Commander General Abdel Fattah al Burhan has conducted several regional and international tours since 2023 to garner international support. Burhan conducted several high-profile meetings with the leaders of Egypt, Qatar, South Sudan, and Turkey in 2023 in a bid to boost SAF legitimacy in the international community.[15] Burhan has also attempted to d...
[Short citation of 8% of the original article]