China-Taiwan Weekly Update, January 16, 2024
Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Alison O’Neil, Karina Wugang, and Frank Mattimoe of the Institute for the Study of War;
Alexis Turek and Yeji Chung of the American Enterprise Institute
Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute
Data Cutoff: January 15, 2025
The China–Taiwan Weekly Update is a joint product from the Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute. The update supports the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, which assesses Chinese campaigns against Taiwan, examines alternative strategies for the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) aggression, and—if necessary—defeat the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.
Key Takeaways
Cross-Strait Relations
Taiwan
Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan (LY) passed opposition-backed amendments to the Constitutional Court after a Cabinet-mandated second review. The amendments will paralyze the Constitutional Court until the LY approves nominees to fill some of its vacant seats, and will make it temporarily impossible for the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to block opposition-sponsored legislation. The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), which together hold a majority of seats in the LY, passed amendments to the Constitutional Court Procedure Act on December 20 despite strong opposition from the DPP. The Executive Branch asked the LY to do a second review of the bill. The LY passed the bill again on January 10 with a 62-51 vote, with all 51 DPP legislators voting against. President Lai Ching-te must now sign the bill. The amendments require that a supermajority of 10 justices (out of a total of 15 on the court) be present to hear a case and at least nine justices vote to rule a law unconstitutional. The court currently has only eight sitting justices, and the opposition parties rejected all seven of the Lai administration’s nominees to fill the vacant seats.[1] The court will therefore be unable to review the constitutionality of any laws until some of the vacancies are filled, eliminating the DPP’s last institutional means of blocking opposition-backed legislation. Taiwan does not have a presidential veto.
The DPP legislative caucus filed for a constitutional review of the bill and a temporary injunction against its implementation on January 15, though President Lai has not yet signed the bill into law. The court does not rule on bills that have not been promulgated into law, however, and has never done so even to issue temporary injunctions. The DPP and Lai’s Cabinet are considering proposing “preventive rights relief,” a legal tool to protect people’s rights before they are violated, to justify asking the court to make an exception. DPP politicians including Premier Cho Jung-tai argued that the paralysis of the Constitutional Court will seriously impact the rights of Taiwanese citizens, as most of the cases the court hears are submitted by citizens. Yang Hao-ching, director-general of the court's clerk department, said that the court handles temporary injunctions and preventive rights relief as separate matters.[2] KMT legislator Lo Chih-chiang argued that that if the Constitutional Court issues temporary sanctions against Constitutional Court Procedure Law amendments that have not yet taken effect, it would be undermining the Constitution and democratic system by infringing on the legitimate right of the legislature to pass laws. KMT-leaning newspaper United Daily News reported that the KMT internally assesses it will be difficult to justify the court hearing the case before the bill becomes law.[3]The hearing and injunction would normally have to happen after President Lai signs the bill. But the court’s current eight justices will be unable to hear the case concerning their powers without violating the new law after President Lai signs the bill, however. The dilemma may trigger a constitutional crisis in Taiwan. Lai is legally required to sign the bill by January 23.[4]
Taiwan’s National Security Bureau (NSB) released a report on January 12 highlighting organized crime and religious communities as infiltration channels to recruit agents and conduct espionage within Taiwan.[5] The report highlights PRC intelligence and United Front agencies’ exploitation of five major infiltration channels to support the PRC’s recruitment of agents: organized crime gangs, underground financial institutions, shell companies, religious groups, and civil society groups.[6] The report states that PRC intelligence operatives attempt to use these societal elements to convince retired military officers to recruit active-duty personnel, establish spy networks via the internet, and provide financial inducements to lure targets, especially those who have problems with debt.
The NSB report also notes that PRC collusion with gangs presents the risk of armed groups assisting in military operations against Taiwan.[7] An AEI-ISW report from May 2024 on PRC short-of-war coercion against Taiwan highlighted the risks of co-optation of military personnel and organized crime elements as part of the PRC’s lines of effort to weaken Taiwan’s will and capacity to defend itself.[8]
Lai has urged increased vigilance against the PRC’s infiltration of Taiwan’s religious community since taking office.[9] The PRC exploits cross-strait religious engagements as one of the less regulated forms of exchange to establish contact between its intelligence officers and Taiwanese targets that have potential to further recruit and develop agents within Taiwan. This tactic reflects the extent to which United Front and intelligence activities permeate PRC civil society and pervade superficially innocent cross-strait exc...
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