Africa File, February 6, 2025: M23 Unilateral Ceasefire; SAF Closes in on Khartoum; US Airstrikes in Northern Somalia; al Shabaab Reinfiltrates Central Somalia; IS Sahel Kidnapping Campaign; US-Algeria Relationship Grows
Authors: Kathryn Tyson, Liam Karr, and Yale Ford
Contributors: Jean-Philip Banane and John Reece
Data Cutoff: February 6, 2025, at 10 a.m.
Editor's Note: The Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute publishes these updates with support from the Institute for the Study of War.
The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.
Key Takeaways:
Sudan. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) is poised to secure a major victory by recapturing Khartoum and pushing the RSF west of the Nile. Securing these objectives would support the SAF’s grand strategic aim of establishing itself as the only legitimate power in Sudan. SAF control over Khartoum would allow the SAF to consolidate control over the eastern bank of the Nile River and prepare for future offensives that aim to defeat the RSF in its strongholds in western Sudan. The RSF continues to attack the SAF in el Fasher, the capital of North Darfur in western Sudan and the last SAF holdout in Darfur, amid SAF gains in Khartoum. The RSF attacks around el Fasher threaten hundreds of thousands of refugees in the city.
DRC. Rwandan-backed M23 rebels declared a unilateral “humanitarian” ceasefire in the eastern DRC ahead of peace talks scheduled for February 7 and 8. A long-term political solution remains unlikely, however. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) still refuses to negotiate with M23, M23 and Rwanda still hold a military advantage to push for their maximalist demands, and there is low confidence in regional blocs as impartial mediators. The DRC, M23, and Rwanda may be open to short-term ceasefires, however, as they seek to reset and set conditions for future offensives. M23’s unilateral ceasefire does not indicate that the group has dropped its expansionist ambitions and may aim to enable M23 to set conditions for future offensive operations by allowing the group to reset and potentially ease international pressure to sanction the group’s primary patron, Rwanda.M23 may have already broken its ceasefire and continued to advance further into South Kivu.
Sahel. The Islamic State has launched a kidnapping campaign targeting foreign nationals across its areas of influence in West Africa. The locations of the kidnappings signal that IS is expanding its areas of operation further from its core areas in the Sahel and Lake Chad, likely through collaboration with local criminal groups. The regional kidnapping campaign is another indicator that ISSP has developed a greater external reach in recent years.
Northern Somalia. US Africa Command conducted airstrikes that killed a senior Islamic State Somalia Province attack planner and several other ISS fighters in northern Somalia on January 1. The strike supports an ongoing counter–IS Somalia Province (ISS) offensive by the Puntland government that came after warnings from US officials that ISS posed a growing transnational threat. ISS will likely reconstitute itself and resume its global functions if the Puntland offensive fails to adequately degrade the group’s revenue streams or set conditions to maintain pressure on ISS’s porous support zones.
Central Somalia. Al Shabaab launched a January offensive in central Somalia to reestablish itself on the east bank of the Shabelle River and disrupt a vital highway that connects Ethiopia to Mogadishu via central Somalia. Somali forces responded to the attempted incursion with a counteroffensive to remove al Shabaab from the east bank of the Shabelle River and degrade the group’s support zones on the west bank of the river. CTP continues to assess that the remaining al Shabaab support zones on the west bank of the Shabelle River will continue to make central Somalia vulnerable to al Shabaab offensives that aim to reinfiltrate previously cleared areas. Degrading al Shabaab’s capabilities is an important US national security interest, as the group has demonstrated its intent to attack the US homeland and its capability to conduct attacks beyond East Africa since 2019.
Algeria. Algeria and the United States have tightened their relationship in 2025 as Algeria likely seeks to diversify its partnerships beyond its traditional defense partner, Russia. More balanced Algerian ties with Russia and the United States will likely cause the Kremlin to rely on Libya more heavily to access the Mediterranean Sea and support its activity in the Sahel as the Kremlin seeks to offset its reliance on Syria. A stronger Algerian-US relationship would position the United States to undercut Iranian influence in the region by mediating between Algeria and Morocco on the Western Sahara dispute and advance US counterterrorism objectives by encouraging cooperation between the two regional leaders to contain instability in the Sahel.
Assessments:
Sudan
The SAF is poised to secure a major victory by recapturing Khartoum and pushing the RSF west of the Nile. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have advanced in Gezira state, central Sudan, and said that it cleared Rapid Support Forces (RSF) “remnants” in three towns 50–70 miles south of Khartoum.[1] The SAF has simultaneously made significant breakthroughs in northern Khartoum, also known as Bahri, since late January and is advancing from the southeast of Khartoum.[2] SAF sources told Sudanese media that the SAF would advance toward the Soba Bridge in southeastern Khartoum, which would cut RSF supply lines and split RSF forces in central and eastern Khartoum by connecting SAF forces in eastern Khartoum and the city center.[3]
Figure 1. Area of SAF and RSF Operations in Khartoum
Source: Kathryn Tyson; Thomas van Linge.
Recapturing Khartoum and pushing the RSF across the Nile River is a military and political victory for the SAF that supports the SAF’s grand strategic aim of establishing itself as the only legitimate power in Sudan. SAF control over Khartoum would allow the SAF to consolidate control over the eastern bank of the Nile River and prepare for future offensives that aim to defeat the RSF in its strongholds in western Sudan. The RSF would struggle to recross the Nile River as the SAF controls several key bridges on the river.[4] Drone footage from February 4 shows lines of RSF military vehicles attempting to flee across the Jebel Awliya Bridge from southwestern Khartoum to western Sudan.[5] This bridge is the RSF’s last remaining route into and out of the city.[6] Khartoum also has airports and military infrastructure that are better positioned to support future offensives in Western Sudan than the SAF’s current command and logistics hub in Port Sudan, which is over 400 miles northeast of Khartoum on Sudan’s Red Sea coast.
SAF control over Khartoum would additionally be a political victory that would boost the SAF’s claim to be Sudan’s only legitimate force. SAF Chief General Abdel Fatteh al Burhan has conducted several regional and international tours since 2023 to garner international support. Burhan met with the leaders of Egypt, Qatar, South Sudan, and Turkey in 2023 to boost SAF legitimacy in the international community.[7] Burhan took a diplomatic tour of West Africa in mid-January 2025 for the first time since the war began in 2023 to boost regional support for the SAF.[8] Burhan has also attempted to delegitimize the RSF and called for the RSF to be designated as a terrorist group during a speech to the UN in September 2024.[9]
Figure 2. The Situation in Sudan
Source: Thomas van Linge
The RSF continues to attack the SAF in el Fasher, the capital of North Darfur in western Sudan and the last SAF holdout in Darfur, which threatens hundreds of thousands of refugees in the city.[10] The RSF conducted its largest attack to date on the SAF in el Fasher between January 21 and 25 as the RSF attempted to respond to its setbacks in Khartoum.[11] International research organizations have expressed concern over the possibility of mass violence against internally displaced persons at Zamzam refugee camp in el Fasher, as the RSF has blocked an exit route from the camp.[12] The RSF has shelled the camp repeatedly and disrupted the delivery of humanitarian aid into the camp.[13] The United States and international humanitarian organizations have condemned the RSF for violence against civilians and acts of genocide in Darfur.[14]
DRC
Rwandan-backed M23 rebels declared a unilateral “humanitarian” ceasefire in the eastern DRC ahead of peace talks scheduled for February 7 and 8. M23 spokesperson Lawrence Kanyuka announced the ceasefire on February 3.[15] The rebel group blamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC’s) government for recent fighting in the eastern DRC and claimed that it had “no intention” of continuing its advance toward the South Kivu provincial capital of Bukavu.[16] M23 forces and Rwandan troops captured the North Kivu provincial capital of Goma in late January, a key economic and trade hub in the eastern DRC.[17]
Figure 3. M23 Advances in Eastern DRC
Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.
M23 announced the ceasefire ahead of a joint summit between member countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the East Africa...
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