Lessons of the Minsk Deal: Breaking the Cycle of Russia’s War in Ukraine
By Nataliya Bugayova
February 11, 2025
Executive Summary
Some peace deals lead to peace, others to more war. The Minsk II deal aimed to end Russia’s limited invasion of Ukraine in 2015 but instead laid the groundwork for the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022. The United States must learn from the Minsk deal or risk a direct Russia-NATO conflict that puts American lives at risk.
Minsk II was a weak deal. It demanded nothing of the invader— Russia. It strengthened the Kremlin’s aggressive worldview that had driven the conflict to begin with. It masked Russian military weakness. It gave the Kremlin time and space to prepare for a larger invasion. The West could have helped Ukraine reach a stronger deal in 2015.
Minsk II gave Russian President Vladimir Putin hope that he could win in Ukraine without war. Russia sought and failed to control Ukraine in 2014 by military means. Minsk II gave Putin a way to demand that Ukraine — an independent state —give Russia control over its internal policies. Putin failed at that too and turned to the full-scale invasion in 2022.
Minsk II helped Putin mask his demands for Ukraine’s surrender behind false calls for peace. The West has repeatedly failed to call out and counter the real Russian demands since 2014. Minsk II reinforced Western delusions that Putin might simply settle if he received some land or if the West metered support to Ukraine or tried harder to negotiate with Putin. The deal also gave an excuse to those who understood the Kremlin’s goals but sought to restore ties with Russia anyway.
Vladislav Surkov, Putin’s close adviser in 2014, said in 2024 that Minsk II “legitimized the first partition of Ukraine.” Surkov’s words confirm Russia’s goal to destroy Ukraine as a state and to use the Minsk deal to do so.[1] He added that “peace is nothing more than the continuation of war by other means.”
Another weak deal today would validate Putin’s 2022 full-scale invasion and give Putin hope to gain more over time. Hope for Putin means more war. More war means a larger war: An absolved Russia that bears little or no cost for its invasion will want more and will rebuild its capability to do more. A larger war would mean a higher cost for the United States, risk to American lives, and risk of a catastrophic escalation.
The Trump Administration has a historic opportunity to break Russia’s cycle of overt war and war through “peace” in Ukraine. To do so, the United States must learn the lessons from the Minsk deal:
Minsk II Context
Putin has tried to control Ukraine in increasingly extreme ways since he came to power in 2000. Russia tried and failed to pressure Ukraine into a Russia-led economic union in 2003.[2] Russia tried and failed to dominate Ukraine’s politics in the mid-2000s.[3] Russia expanded its influence over Ukraine’s politics in the mid-2010s through its favorite Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych. Ukrainians drove out the increasingly authoritarian Yanukovych in the pro-democracy Euromaidan Revolution in 2014.
As Ukraine was stabilizing after Euromaidan, Russia used the moment of Ukraine’s vulnerability to seize Ukrainian land. Russian military forces illegally occupied Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula in March 2014. Russia then tried to take control of at least six southeastern regions of Ukraine.[4] Russia seized parts of Luhansk and Donetsk regions in the east, but Ukraine’s resistance thwarted the Kremlin’s plans to seize more.[5]
The Kremlin used Russia’s regular military and the irregular forces that Russia created in Ukraine (the so-called Donetsk [DNR] and Luhansk [LNR] Peoples’ Republics) during the 2014 invasion of Ukraine.[6]
The 2015 Minsk II agreement attempted to end the conflict through a ceasefire and political measures. Representatives from Ukraine, the so-called DNR and LNR, Russia, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) signed Minsk II in February 2015.[7] The Normandy Four format (Germany, France, Ukraine, Russia) facilitated the Minks II agreement.[8]
Kremlin-controlled forces repeatedly violated the ceasefire.[9] Russia decisively broke the deal when it launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Russia’s Goals in Ukraine
Winning in Ukraine for Putin has always meant more than seizing territory, forcing Ukraine into neutrality, or countering NATO.
Putin is not after a portion of Ukraine. Seizing Crimea and portions of two eastern regions in Ukraine in 2014 was not enough for Putin. He reinvaded in 2022.
It is not about neutrality. Russia’s own actions have made Ukraine less neutral. Ukraine was a non-aligned state in 2014 even after the EuroMaidan Revolution. Ukraine renounced its non-aligned status only in December of 2014 — as a direct result of the Russian invasion.[10]
Nor is it about Ukraine’s NATO membership per se. Russia made Ukraine want NATO more. A minority of Ukrainians supported NATO membership before 2014; the majority of support came after Russia invaded.[11] Russian fears of imminent Ukrainian NATO membership did not drive the 2022 invasion either. Putin had effectively blocked Ukrainian accession to NATO by 2022.[12] Putin also explicitly said in 2024 that Biden offered to postpone consideration of Ukraine's membership in NATO for 10 years...
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