Africa File, February 13, 2025: SAF Announces Government Plan and Russian Naval Base; DRC Concedes to Direct Talks with M23; Turkey’s Growing Defense Partnerships in Africa

Africa File, February 13, 2025: SAF Announces Government Plan and Russian Naval Base; DRC Concedes to Direct Talks with M23; Turkey’s Growing Defense Partnerships in Africa

Authors: Kathryn Tyson, Liam Karr, and Yale Ford

Contributors: John Reece, Nick Markiewicz, and Jean-Philip Banane

Data Cutoff: February 13, 2025, at 10 a.m.

Editor's Note: The Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute publishes these updates with support from the Institute for the Study of War.

The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

Key Takeaways:

• Sudan. The leader of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) outlined plans for a new government that likely aims to legitimize the SAF as the sole governing power in Sudan after it captures the Sudanese capital, Khartoum. The SAF is advancing on the Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) last positions in central Khartoum, and the SAF capture of Khartoum would further support the SAF’s grand strategic aim of establishing itself as the only legitimate power in Sudan. A recent fracture within Sudan’s main civilian coalition will additionally benefit the SAF’s claim to be the only legitimate actor in Sudan because it decreases the threat to the SAF of a rival, unified civilian government. The SAF’s strengthening position in Sudan will benefit its Iranian and Russian partners as Iran and Russia seek Red Sea naval bases in Sudan.
• DRC. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda agreed to a proposed ceasefire and to restart bilateral peace talks and direct negotiations between the DRC and Rwandan-backed M23 rebels. The DRC's agreement to resume dialogue with M23 is a major concession. The DRC is unlikely to accede to M23's and Rwanda’s maximalist demands, however, which means that fighting will likely continue in the coming months. M23 has continued to advance despite Rwanda's agreement to the ceasefire proposal, and CTP continues to assess that M23, Rwanda, and pro-DRC forces will use any ceasefire to reconstitute and set conditions for future offensives.
• Turkey. Turkey is advancing as a leading alternative to Western and Russian security partnerships across West Africa as it moves to backfill recently departed French forces in Chad. Russia’s and Turkey’s efforts to fill the security void left by decreased Western engagement in West Africa are not mutually exclusive and are sometimes complementary. Turkey’s growing role as a leading counterterrorism partner in Africa and Syria could lead to increased Salafi-jihadi attack plots in Turkey.

Assessments:

Sudan

The leader of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) outlined plans for a new government that likely aims to legitimize the SAF as the sole governing power in Sudan after it captures the Sudanese capital, Khartoum. SAF leader Abdel Fattah al Burhan said during a speech on February 8 that the SAF would form a technocratic government to establish a constitution, prepare for elections, and support the SAF in achieving its military goals of “purging” Sudan of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).[1] Unspecified military sources told Reuters that Burhan’s planned changes to the constitution would remove all references to partnerships with civilians or the RSF and place sole authority with the SAF.[2] The SAF will then appoint a technocratic prime minister who will subsequently appoint a cabinet.[3] The military sources added that Burhan would form this new government after the SAF’s imminent recapture of Khartoum.[4]

The SAF announced similar plans to form a technocratic government with the RSF in 2021, but disagreements over the power-sharing structure led to the current civil war. The SAF and RSF jointly launched a coup and ousted former Sudanese dictator Omar al Bashir following large-scale civilian protests in 2019.[5] The SAF, RSF, and civilian coalition subsequently agreed to create a transitional government headed by Burhan that planned to transfer power to civilian control in November 2021.[6] RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti, served as Burhan’s deputy in the council.[7] The SAF and RSF conducted a second coup in October 2021 to dissolve the transitional government and institute their own technocratic government after Burhan and Hemedti demanded reforms that aimed to maintain both leaders’ patronage networks and shield them from accountability for their actions during the Bashir regime.[8] Similar concerns bled into subsequent disagreements between the SAF and RSF, particularly over the timeline and method of how the RSF would integrate into a national military.[9] The RSF began the civil war when it attempted to seize sole power from the SAF due to these disagreements in April 2023.[10]

The SAF’s seemingly imminent capture of Khartoum will further advance the SAF’s grand strategic objective of establishing itself as the only legitimate power in Sudan. The SAF has recaptured nearly all of northern Khartoum, also known as Khartoum Bahri, from the RSF since it launched a lightning offensive in the city in January 2025.[11] An unspecified former military officer in touch with units on the ground told the Financial Times that the SAF is now within 1.2 miles (2 kilometers) of the presidential palace in central Khartoum.[12] The SAF is advancing on at least three axes toward central Khartoum to expel the remaining RSF forces from the area.[13]

Figure 1. Are...
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