Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 13, 2025
Angelica Evans, Davit Gasparyan, Nicole Wolkov, Olivia Gibson, and Frederick W. Kagan
February 13, 2025, 5:30pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45am ET on February 13. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 14 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Ukraine's European partners announced new military assistance to Ukraine amid the February 12 Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) meeting. The United Kingdom (UK) pledged 150 million pounds (about $188 million) in military support, including drones, "dozens" of battle tanks and armored vehicles, and air defense systems, and confirmed plans to provide Ukraine with an additional 4.5 billion pounds (about $5.6 billion) worth of military assistance in 2025.[1] The UK stated that it will provide Ukraine will over 50 armored and protective vehicles, including modernized T-72 tanks, by the end of Spring 2025.[2] Germany committed to supplying 100 IRIS-T air defense system missiles to Ukraine in the near future, and German defense company Helsing announced the delivery of 6,000 AI-equipped drones to Ukraine.[3] Norway joined the Ukrainian Drone Coalition and revealed plans to establish and equip Ukraine's "Northern Brigade" as part of a broader Nordic initiative in which the Nordic countries will equip and train one Ukrainian battalion each.[4] The Netherlands announced the delivery of 25 YPR armored infantry vehicles, Latvia announced the donation of 42 armored personnel carriers, and Estonia also pledged to allocate 0.25 percent of its GDP for military assistance to Ukraine in 2025.[5]
Russia reportedly lost just over 5,000 tanks and armored vehicles during 2024 compared with 3,000 in 2023. The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated on February 10 that Russia lost 1,400 main battle tanks (roughly four tank divisions' worth) and over 3,700 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and armored personnel carriers (APCs) — totaling 5,100 lost tanks and armored vehicles in 2024.[6] Data from the Ukrainian General Staff indicates that Ukrainian forces damaged or destroyed over 3,000 Russian tanks and almost 9,000 armored vehicles in 2024, and IISS' estimates likely only account for destroyed tanks and armored vehicles.[7] IISS assessed in February 2024 that Russia would be able to sustain its then-rate of vehicle losses (over 3,000 tanks, APCs, and IFVs annually as of 2023) until February 2026 or 2027 by refurbishing vehicles from Soviet-era storage facilities.[8] It remains unclear if the Russian military command will remain willing or able to sustain this increased rate of armored vehicle losses in 2025, as Russian forces appear to be adapting their tactics to limit such losses.
IISS noted that Russia has adapted some of its tactics to address ongoing equipment shortages and is increasingly relying on infantry-led assaults to advance along the frontline.[9] ISW began observing indications in November and December 2024 that Russian forces were using fewer armored vehicles in Donetsk Oblast, particularly in areas where Russian forces had previously relied heavily on mechanized assaults to make significant tactical advances.[10] Russian forces have continued to use fewer armored vehicles in Donetsk Oblast and throughout the frontline, possibly due to Ukrainian drone operations, equipment constraints, or non-conducive ground conditions brought about by rainy weather. Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated on February 13 that successful Ukrainian drone strikes have been the main factor — and not poor weather and ground conditions — prompting Russian forces to use fewer armored vehicles along the frontline.[11] Trehubov noted that Russian forces also have issues supplying shells to some unspecified frontline positions, possibly due to successful Ukrainian strikes against Russian ammunition depots, and have thus decreased the intensity of shelling in such areas.
It remains unclear if Russia can repair and newly-produce a sufficient number of tanks and armored vehicles to replace losses in Ukraine and equip new Russian units. IISS...
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