Africa File, February 20, 2025: M23 Advance Continues Unchallenged; SAF Grows Partnerships with Iran and Russia; RSF Creates Parallel Government in Sudan

Africa File, February 20, 2025: M23 Advance Continues Unchallenged; SAF Grows Partnerships with Iran and Russia; RSF Creates Parallel Government in Sudan

Authors: Yale Ford, Kathryn Tyson, and Liam Karr

Contributors: Nick Markiewicz, and John Reece

Data Cutoff: February 20, 2025, at 10 a.m.

Editor's Note: The Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute publishes these updates with support from the Institute for the Study of War.

Read CTP’s new daily briefing series, the Congo War Security Review, here.

The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

Key Takeaways:

• Democratic Republic of the Congo. Rwandan-backed M23 captured the South Kivu provincial capital, Bukavu, and continued to advance on several axes in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). M23’s advances have set conditions for the group to expand its campaign into the interior of the DRC by strengthening its supply lines with Rwanda and securing access to roads that connect to adjacent regions of the DRC. M23’s control of Bukavu and Lake Kivu also gives M23 and Rwanda significant economic benefits. M23 will likely continue to advance in the eastern DRC due to FARDC’s ineffectiveness as the Congolese government seeks more effective external support. The West is increasing pressure on Rwanda to withdraw from the DRC and cut its support for M23, which would decrease M23’s military effectiveness, however. Various international and domestic peace talks have stalled, and CTP continues to assess that the Congolese government will be unwilling to accede to M23’s and Rwanda’s maximalist demands. M23’s offensive has significantly restricted humanitarian operations and caused widespread population displacement.
• Sudan—International. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) agreed to several deals, including a Russian naval base, during separate diplomatic meetings with Iran and Russia in mid-February. A Russian naval base in Sudan would support Russia’s strategic objective of threatening NATO’s southern flank from Africa and the Mediterranean Sea while decreasing Russian reliance on bases in Syria after the collapse of the Bashar al Assad regime in December 2024. Iran also seeks to grow bilateral ties with the SAF to secure an Iranian Red Sea naval base. An Iranian naval base at Port Sudan would support Iran’s and its Axis of Resistance’s power projection and attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Russia could allow Iran to operate from Russia’s naval base in Port Sudan if Russia and Sudan follow through on the naval port deal.
• Sudan—Domestic. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and other RSF-aligned political and military factions will create a new government in Sudan on February 21 as the RSF seeks to portray itself as the legitimate governing power in Sudan. The RSF proposal to form a parallel government comes after the leader of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) outlined plans for a new SAF-led government on February 8. The RSF has committed more mass atrocities against civilians and refugees in several areas in Sudan as it faces military setbacks in Khartoum. The RSF’s abuses across Sudan continue a pattern of indiscriminate violence against civilians and genocide.

Assessments:

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Rwandan-backed M23 captured the South Kivu provincial capital, Bukavu, and continued to advance on several axes in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). M23 took several towns with minimal resistance as it advanced 18 miles along the RN2 highway from the Congolese army’s (FARDC’s) stronghold at the Kavumu airport to Bukavu on February 14.[1] FARDC troops, allied militia fighters, and Burundian soldiers fled from Bukavu on February 13 due to the lack of air support from Kavumu airport and to avoid casualties.[2] M23 took control of all key points in Bukavu by February 16.[3]

Figure 1. M23 Advances in Eastern DRC

Source: Liam Karr; Nick Markiewicz and Yale Ford.

M23 has continued to advance in South Kivu on two separate axes after it seized Bukavu. The rebel group advanced southward from Bukavu along the RN5 highway and is about 22 miles from Uvira after it captured several towns near the tri-border area of southwestern Rwanda, northwestern Burundi, and eastern DRC on February 18.[4] Uvira is the second-most-populated city in South Kivu and a transportation hub with access to Lake Tanganyika and Burundi’s economic capital, Bujumbura, roughly 16 miles to the east.[5] French and local media reported that FARDC soldiers initially fled to Uvira on February 13 and then retreated further south from Uvira on February 19.[6]

Figure 2. M23 Advances Southward in South Kivu Province

Source: Liam Karr; Nick Markiewicz and Yale Ford.

M23 forces advanced southwest on the RN2 from Bukavu toward Kamituga, a gold mining hub and a gateway town to the south-central regions of the DRC.[7] M23 captured Walungu, a village about 20 miles south of Bukavu and 80 miles from Kamituga, on February 17.[8] A Congolese social media account circulated a video of M23 “general” Bernard Byamungu denouncing the DRC government during a speech in Walungu.[9]

Figure 3. M23 Advances Northward Toward Lubero

Source: Liam Karr; Nick Markiewicz and Yale Ford.

M23 simultaneously restarted an offensive 265 miles north of Bukavu in North Kivu province along the RN2 toward the district capital of Lubero, which is the last FARDC stronghold before the commercial hub Butembo. M23 captured Mambasa, which is where the FARDC halted M23’s previous advance in late December, and advanced another nine miles to Kitsombiro village on February 18 and 19.[10] M23 has since attempted to flank Congolese defensive positions north of Kitsombiro, ...
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