China-Taiwan Weekly Update, February 20, 2025
Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Alison O’Neil, Karina Wugang, and Grant Morgan of the Institute for the Study of War;
Alexis Turek and Yeji Chung of the American Enterprise Institute
Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute
Data Cutoff: February 18, 2025
The China–Taiwan Weekly Update is a joint product from the Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute. The update supports the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, which assesses Chinese campaigns against Taiwan, examines alternative strategies for the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) aggression, and—if necessary—defeat the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.
Key Takeaways
Cross-Strait Relations
Taiwan
Taiwanese civil society groups have now submitted 52 recall petitions, 36 of which target opposition legislators and 16 of which target legislators from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The 2024 legislative election results and recent polling suggest that up to 12 Kuomintang (KMT) and 6 DPP legislators are at risk of getting recalled. The 52 recall election petitions have received signatures from over one percent of eligible voters in their respective districts, meeting the threshold to advance the recall process.[1] Some of the 52 recall petitions target the same legislator, though each petition is considered an independent proposal. The next step is for recall petitioners to get signatures from at least 10 percent of eligible voters within the relevant electoral district within 60 days. Once Taiwan’s Central Election Commission verifies these signatures, the recall vote commences. A special election must be held within three months if a majority of voters vote to recall the elected official and this majority exceeds 25 percent of eligible voters in the district.
The Legislative Yuan (LY) currently has no majority party with the DPP holding 51 seats, the KMT holding 54 seats (including two KMT-aligned independents), and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) holding eight seats. The KMT and TPP have a majority in practice, however, given the recent alignment between them. The DPP could regain control of the LY if its supporters can recall and replace six KMT legislators and maintain all contested DPP seats. DPP legislative caucus chair Ker Chien-ming called for a mass recall campaign against opposition legislators on January 4 in response to significant polarization and major disagreements between the opposition and ruling party. The KMT responded by announcing a recall campaign of its own.
Twelve KMT legislators and six DPP legislators are likely the most vulnerable to being recalled. Seven of the KMT legislators and three DPP legislators won their 2024 legislative races by slim margins, which their opposition could overcome in a special election. Legislators Yeh Yuan-chih (KMT-New Taipei City VII), Niu Hsu-ting (KMT-Taoyuan City I), Tu Chuan-chi (KMT-Taoyuan City II), Lu Ming-che (KMT-Taoyuan City III), Sean Liao Wei-hsiang (KMT-Taichung City IV), Yu Hao (KMT-Nantou County II), Huang Chien-pin (KMT-Taitung County), Wu Pei-yi (DPP-Taipei City V), Chang Hung-lu (DPP-New Taipei City VI), and Wu Chi-ming (DPP-New Taipei City X) all won their races by roughly five percentage points or less in 2024.[2] All but Lu Ming-che, Chang Hung-lu, and Wu Chi-ming flipped their seats in the 2024 election, making them more vulnerable to flipping to the previous party.[3] Taiwanese political commentators identified eight additional high-risk candidates based on their relatively slim margins of victory (ten percentage points or less), high numbers of signatures collected for the recall movement, and significant public movements against them. Those include Wang Hung-wei (KMT Taipei City III), Lee Yen-hsiu (KMT-Taipei City IV), Lo Chih-chiang (KMT Taipei City VI), Hsu Chiao-hsin (KMT-Taipei City VII), Fu Kun-chi (KMT-Hualian County), and Rosalia Wu Szu-yao (DPP-Taipei City I).[4] Fu Kun-chi and Rosalia Wu are notably the KMT majority leader in the LY and the secretary general of the DPP’s legislative caucus, respectively. Indigenous DPP legislators Chen Ying (Lowland Aborigine Constituency) and Wu Li-hua (Highland Aborigine Constituency) are also considered high risk due to the unique election procedures for Indigenous legislators and the lack of strong support for the DPP in these constituencies. Indigenous legislators have six reserved seats within the LY, and the top three candidates from each constituency are given seats.[5]
While it is unlikely that all high-risk candidates will be removed from their seats, it is possible that Taiwanese civil society groups can shift the balance of power within the LY to favor the ruling DPP. The LY, under KMT leadership, has proposed budget cuts that would hinder certain Taiwanese defense efforts, despite the DPP urging to increase defense spending. These budget cuts and general disunity within the Taiwanese government could leave Taiwan more vulnerable to PRC coercion.
KMT- and TPP-backed amendments to Taiwan’s Public Officials Election and Recall Act could make additional recall efforts more difficult, however. President William Lai Ching-te promulgated amendments on February 18 requiring those who initiate and sign recall petitions to provide photocopies of their identification cards instead of their ID numbers and addresses.[6] The amendment comes into effect on February 20, impacting all ensuing recall petitions.
Taiwanese prosecutors indicted former KMT legislator Chang Hsien-yao on February 12 for allegedly acting on behalf ...
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