Africa File, February 27, 2025: SAF Advances West Toward Darfur; M23 and DRC Reset as International Pressure Grows on Rwanda; ISSP Poses Clear Transnational Threat; al Shabaab Central Somalia Offensive
Authors: Yale Ford, Kathryn Tyson, and Liam Karr
Contributors: Nick Markiewicz and John Reece
Data Cutoff: February 27, 2025, at 10 a.m.
Editor's Note: The Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute publishes these updates with support from the Institute for the Study of War.
The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.
Key Takeaways:
Sudan. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) are advancing in south-central Sudan and setting conditions for an offensive into Rapid Support Forces (RSF) strongholds in Darfur. The SAF captured el Obeid—a state capital in south-central Sudan that will likely support SAF offensives into Rapid Support Forces (RSF) strongholds in Darfur—on February 20. The SAF will likely attempt to advance along a major east-west highway toward al Fasher, the capital city of North Darfur, to break the RSF’s hold on Darfur and relieve besieged SAF troops. The SAF has also advanced against the RSF in Khartoum, as the SAF seeks to push the RSF west of the Nile River. SAF control over Khartoum would allow the SAF to consolidate control over the eastern bank of the Nile River and support an offensive against the RSF in Darfur.
Democratic Republic of the Congo. African-led peace initiatives face several obstacles as they continue to pursue short-term ceasefires to halt Rwandan-backed M23’s continued expansion and long-term peace agreements to end the fighting in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The international community has imposed limited sanctions on Rwanda for supporting M23 but remains hesitant to levy stronger sanctions that would make Rwanda more likely to cut its support for M23. M23 likely slowed its expansion in the last week to solidify its control over recently captured areas, reset for further military advances, and possibly decrease international pressure on Rwanda. M23 is setting conditions to justify imminent offensives, including claiming that the Congolese government was behind an alleged assassination attempt on the leader of M23’s political wing on February 27. DRC President Félix Tshisekedi announced planned changes to the DRC government and the Congolese army (FARDC) that likely aim to shore up his fragile power base and increase FARDC’s military effectiveness in preparation for a counteroffensive against M23.
Morocco. IS Sahel Province (ISSP) is conducting a campaign to establish attack capabilities in Morocco and potentially use Morocco as a bridge for attacks in Europe. ISSP has developed a greater external reach in recent years that increases its risk to North Africa, foreign personnel in Africa, and likely Europe as the group continues to demonstrate growing external ambitions and capabilities.
Somalia. Al Qaeda’s Somali affiliate, al Shabaab, is launching a major offensive across central Somalia as the group attempts to overturn landmark, US-backed Somali counterterrorism gains from 2022. Al Shabaab targeted symbolically and militarily important towns in areas that al Shabaab had long controlled before the Somali government launched the 2022 offensive. Al Shabaab seeks to overwhelm Somali forces and link its support zones in central Somalia with its core territories in southern Somalia. The withdrawal of Burundian forces from the African Union mission in Somalia may create gaps for al Shabaab to exploit in central Somalia.
Assessments:
Sudan.
The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) captured el Obeid—a state capital in south-central Sudan that will likely support SAF offensives into Rapid Support Forces (RSF) strongholds in Darfur—on February 20.[1] The RSF had besieged the SAF in el Obeid since April 2023.[2] The SAF has advanced westward from positions in White Nile State—around 160 miles south of Khartoum—along an east-west highway that stretches from Khartoum to Darfur via el Obeid since January 2025.[3] El Obeid has an airport with an operational runway, but satellite imagery shows that the most aircraft there are damaged or destroyed.
Figure 1. SAF Advances Against the RSF Toward El Fasher
Source: Kathryn Tyson; John Reece; Thomas van Linge.
SAF advances are setting conditions for an offensive against the RSF center of gravity in western Sudan. The RSF has historical bases of support among primarily Arab tribes in Darfur and maintains strong socioeconomic relations in the region, which help the RSF generate income and recruits.[4] The RSF controls airports and supply lines throughout western Sudan, through which it moves weapons, fuel, and other matériel. The United Arab Emirates has sent weapons to the RSF via an airstrip in eastern Chad that crosses into western Sudan since the civil war began in April 2023, according to the United Nations.[5]
Figure 2. Control of Terrain in Sudan’s Civil War
Source: Kathryn Tyson; Thomas van Linge.
The SAF will likely try to advance further west along the highway toward al Fasher—the capital city of North Darfur—to break the RSF hold on western Sudan and relieve besieged SAF troops. The SAF has continued its westward advance from el Obeid toward al Nahud, where the RSF has encircled another SAF base.[6] Local Sudanese sources posted videos of Sudanese tribesmen entering al Nahud from the west to reportedly meet SAF units approaching from the east.[7] The SAF seeks to eventually merge with SAF elements in al Fasher, where ongoing fighting in the town has killed over 700 civilians since the RSF began besieging the SAF there in April 2024.[8] RSF attacks on el Fasher have repeatedly killed refugees in the nearby Zamzam camp, which has over 400,000 internally displaced persons.[9] SAF leader Abdel Fatteh al Burhan on February 9 that the SAF refuses to negotiate with the RSF until the RSF ends its siege on el Fasher, among other conditions.[10]
The SAF has also advanced south from el Obeid to relieve another besieged SAF position and secure its southern flank. The RSF-aligned rebel group known as the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N) controls large swathes of terrain south of el Obeid in South Kordofan State and has besieged SAF positions in al Dilling—the second-largest city in the state.[11] The SAF broke through the SPLN-M and RSF siege on al Dilling on February 24 and then captured areas around the city.[12] The recent SAF advances in Kordofan extend SAF control over the Greater Nile Oil Pipeline—a key energy artery that runs from South Sudan to Port Sudan via Kordofan and Khartoum.[13]
The SAF has advanced against the RSF in Khartoum, as the SAF seeks to push the RSF west of the Nile River. The SAF captured Soba Bridge on February 24—a key bridge on the Blue Nile River that gives the SAF an additional route into RSF-controlled central Khartoum.[14] The SAF has recaptured nearly all of northern Khartoum, also known as Khartoum Bahri, from the RSF since it launched an offensive into the city in January 2025.[15] The SAF is advancing on at least three axes toward central Khartoum to expel the remaining RSF units from the area.[16]
Figure 3. Area of SAF and RSF Operations in Khartoum
Source: Kathryn Tyson; John Reece; Thomas van Linge.
SAF control over Khartoum would allow the SAF to consolidate control over the eastern bank of the Nile River and support SAF offensives into western Sudan. The RSF would struggle to recross the Nile River given SAF control of key bridges on the river.[17] Drone footage from February 4 shows lines of RSF military vehicles trying to flee from southwestern Khartoum to western Sudan across the Jebel Awliya Bridge, which is the RSF’s last remaining link to the city.[18] Khartoum also has airports and military infrastructure that are better positioned to support future offensives in western Sudan than the SAF’s current command and logistics hub in Port Sudan, which is over 400 miles northeast of Khartoum on Sudan’s Red Sea coast.
Democratic Republic of the Congo
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