Iran Update, March 3, 2025
Kelly Campa, Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, Carolyn Moorman, Ria Reddy, Siddhant Kishore, Alexandra Braverman, Avery Borens, Parker Hempel, Maryam Sadr, Bailey Pasternak, and Nicholas Carl
Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET
The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.
Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Iran appears to be revising its air defense concepts since Israel neutralized the Iranian S-300s in 2024. Brigadier General Ali Reza Sabahi Fard, who commands the Artesh Air Defense Force and Khatam ol Anbia Joint Air Defense Headquarters, said on March 1 that the armed forces plan to change their air defense “tactics” in response to “current threats.”[1] Sabahi Fard was likely referring to the possibility of a conventional strike on Iran. Iranian officials have conducted a flurry of activities in recent months that further reflect their concern about a potential strike on Iran. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri appointed Sabahi Fard as commander of the Khatam ol Anbia Joint Air Defense Headquarters in early February 2025.[2] This headquarters is responsible for coordinating air defense activity between the Artesh and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Sabahi Fard’s appointment highlights the regime focus on strengthening Iran’s air defense capabilities and improving air defense coordination between the Artesh and IRGC. The Artesh Air Defense Force and IRGC Aerospace Force have also conducted a series of exercises, particularly around Iranian nuclear infrastructure, in recent weeks.[3] These exercises have tested indigenous Iranian air defense systems, such as the Bavar 373.[4] Iran may recognize that Russia’s constrained manufacturing capacity and demand for ground-based air defense systems will likely prevent Iran from acquiring new S-300s in the near future, and Iran may therefore prioritize the development of its indigenous systems. Sabahi Fard announced on March 2 that Iran will soon unveil a new version of the Bavar 373.[5]
Iranian leaders are responding to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted strikes into Iran in its April and October 2024 that neutralized the S-300s.[6] These Russian-sourced S-300s were the most advanced Iranian air defense capability to this point. The loss of the S-300s has forced Tehran to develop new ways to counter aerial threats, though it is far from clear that it will develop any seriously viable solutions.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz directed the IDF on March 3 to “prepare to defend the Druze community” in response to fighting in Jaramana, Rif Dimashq.[7] It is unclear what political end state the Israeli government seeks to achieve with these plans. The Israeli government has yet to release further details or articulate a clear vision of what a victory would encompass. Netanyahu said on February 23 that the Israeli government will “not tolerate any threat to the Druze community” and called for southern Syria to fully demilitarize.[8] Protests erupted across Syria, particularly in majority Druze areas, on February 25 and 26, rejecting Israeli intervention.[9] The Druze community is highly diverse and loyalty to a particular leader within the community varies across Israel, Lebanon, and Syria.[10] Prominent Lebanese Druze politician Walid Jumblatt claimed on March 2 that Israel was attempting to stoke sectarian divisions within Syria.[11]
Growing tensions in southern Syria risk destabilizing the interim Syrian government, which would create opportunities for ISIS and the IRGC to expand their presences in Syria, contrary to Israeli objectives. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz warned on February 25 that Israel would attack the interim Syrian government or “terrorist organizations” if they try to establish themselves in southern Syria.[12] Such fighting could distract the interim government and create opportunities for the IRGC and ISIS to make inroads in other places in Syria.[13]
The interim Syrian government is likely trying to increase security cooperation with local actors in southern Syria. Druze Jaramana Shield Brigade fighters attacked HTS-led forces at a checkpoint to Jaramana, Rif Dimashq, on March 1, killing one fighter and kidnapping another.[14] A delegation of Druze officials led by former Men of Dignity member Laith al Balous negotiated the release of the hostage and permitted HTS-led forces to enter Jaramana to arrest the wanted fighters.[15] Balous accompanied a delegation of Druze officials to Damascus on February 24 to discuss security cooperation within Suwayda Province and southern Syria.[16] Jaramana is a former Assad regime stronghold with several regime-aligned Druze militias.[17] HTS-led forces have faced resistance from former Assad regime members, as they attempt to consolidate territorial control over Syria.
The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) announced an immediate ceasefire with Turkey on March 1.[18] The PKK Executive Committee stated that it would disarm in line with imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan’s call to dissolve on February 27.[19] The PKK’s People’s Defense Center Command Headquarters ordered a ceasefire that is ”valid for all our forces,” including ”all autonomous units.”[20] It remains unclear at this time the extent that sub-national PKK...
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