Iran Update, March 6, 2025
Johanna Moore, Kelly Campa, Siddhant Kishore, Ria Reddy, Katherine Wells, Carolyn Moorman, Victoria Penza, Avery Borens, Annika Ganzeveld, and Brian Carter
Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET
The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.
Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Small-scale insurgent cells have started to emerge and attack Syrian interim government forces in certain areas of Syria. Former Assad regime members conducted coordinated attacks on Syrian military checkpoints and patrols in Jableh, Beit Ana, and Daliyah in Latakia Province on March 6.[1] Interim government forces deployed to the area and cordoned off the area, presumably ahead of a clearing effort.[2] Interim government forces suppressed fighters in Beit Ana and Daliyah but continue to engage former Assad regime members in the Latakia countryside at the time of this writing.[3] CTP-ISW will continue to monitor this developing situation. Former Assad regime members have killed at least 13 Syrian soldiers on March 6.[4] Former Assad regime loyalists have announced their intent to restore Assad’s rule in Syria. It is unlikely that all of the individuals who participated in the attacks on interim government forces joined in the fighting to topple the government and restore Assad, however.[5]
Former Assad regime members will very likely form the most effective insurgent cells, given their pre-established networks. Former Assad regime members already have preexisting networks that they can leverage to rapidly organize insurgent cells. These networks are military, intelligence, and political networks and criminal syndicates who were regime supporters and lost significant economic and political influence in the aftermath of Assad’s fall. These networks could enable former Assad regime members to coordinate attacks across wider areas. This is particularly true in former regime stronghold areas in coastal Syria.
These hardcore Assadists will likely exploit a variety of grievances against the Syrian interim government to recruit new members who may or may not be initially motivated by a desire to restore Assad. Insurgent groups often attract supporters who hold a range of social, economic, and political grievances.[6] Interim government forces have conducted near-constant raids in former regime strongholds targeting former Assad regime members since coming to power in December 2024.[7] These raids, while resulting in the arrest of many mid- to high-level Assad regime officials, have also fueled reports of revenge-based attacks and harassment, particularly against the Alawite community.[8] Members of the Alawite community have expressed their belief that Alawites are being economically disenfranchised by Sunnis as part of a broader effort to marginalize the Alawite community.[9] This is not true; all of Syria is economically devastated, but Alawites believe they are ”uniquely” experiencing economic issues nonetheless.[10] Former Assad regime members have reportedly used Alawite fears of attacks on the community to mobilize young men to take up arms.[11] Interim government forces have also launched a campaign to interdict drug smuggling in western Syria, cutting off a once-steady revenue stream for some criminal syndicates and their beneficiaries.[12] Insurgent groups can leverage these grievances against the interim government to increase their supporter base, and have already begun to do so.
Poorly executed counter-insurgency operations risk fueling a cycle of violence and increased local support for insurgent groups if not conducted...
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