Africa File, March 20, 2025: Qatari-Mediated Ceasefire in DRC; SAF Closes in on Khartoum; RSF Attacks Spread to South Sudan; Al Shabaab Ramadan Offensive; Tigray Simmers as Amhara Escalates; Russia’s Red Sea Efforts; Burkinabe Massacres

Africa File, March 20, 2025: Qatari-Mediated Ceasefire in DRC; SAF Closes in on Khartoum; RSF Attacks Spread to South Sudan; Al Shabaab Ramadan Offensive; Tigray Simmers as Amhara Escalates; Russia’s Red Sea Efforts; Burkinabe Massacres

Authors: Liam Karr, Kathryn Tyson, Yale Ford, and Jean-Philip Banane

Contributors: John Reece and Nick Markiewicz

Data Cutoff: March 20, 2025, at 10 a.m.

The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

Key Takeaways:

• Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda agreed to a Qatari-mediated ceasefire, but fundamental disagreements remain an obstacle to long-term peace efforts. African-led peace efforts continue to face challenges from regional rivalries and mutual distrust between the belligerents and mediators in the eastern DRC conflict. The Qatari-mediated agreement comes after Rwandan-backed M23 rebels captured a key district capital in the eastern DRC from Congolese forces, despite both sides nominally agreeing to multiple ceasefires. The DRC, Rwanda, and M23 will likely remain open to short-term ceasefires as they seek to reset and set conditions for future offensives.
• Sudan. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have made several operationally significant advances against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in central Khartoum in recent days and are poised to retake the last key RSF-controlled areas in the capital in the coming weeks. SAF control over Khartoum would help the SAF control the eastern bank of the Nile River and prepare for future offensives that aim to defeat the RSF in its strongholds in western Sudan. The recapture of Khartoum would also mark a significant milestone in the SAF effort to establish itself as the only legitimate power in Sudan. 
• South Sudan. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are likely backing opposing sides in South Sudan, which risks fueling a possible civil war in South Sudan. The RSF attacked a major South Sudanese Nuer opposition militia near the Sudan-South Sudan border after the militia reportedly tried to reach an SAF weapons cache. The SAF is likely leveraging its ties with militias in northern South Sudan to counter any RSF efforts to use South Sudan as a rear support base as the SAF tries to contain the RSF west of the Nile River. South Sudan faces a high risk of civil war as violence and political tensions continue to worsen.
• Somalia. Al Qaeda’s Somali affiliate al Shabaab is attempting to overwhelm Somali forces around Mogadishu and in central Somalia. The group has escalated attacks around Mogadishu, including an attempt to assassinate the Somali president, and increasingly infiltrated the capital since the beginning of Ramadan at the end of February. Al Shabaab has maintained an offensive northeast of Mogadishu across central Somalia since January 2025 that seeks to encircle the capital and overturn landmark, United States-backed, Somali counterterrorism gains from 2022. Al Shabaab likely aims to exploit gaps left by overstretched Somali forces, but it is unclear whether moving into Mogadishu or central Somalia is its primary objective.
• Ethiopia. Opposing factions in northern Ethiopia’s Tigray region are reportedly negotiating to deescalate tensions, but an offensive by ethno-nationalist Amhara militias threatens to destabilize Ethiopia further. A new offensive by Amhara Fano militants will further strain Ethiopian forces and could complicate the situation in Tigray, given Fano’s long-standing territorial dispute with Tigray. The conflicts in Amhara and Tigray may escalate into a proxy or a regional war between longtime rivals Ethiopia and Eritrea, which have both mobilized for war in recent months.
• Russia. The Kremlin reached a deal to train the Ethiopian navy as it seeks to increase its influence in the Red Sea and supplant the West in Africa. The Kremlin has pursued naval deals with Eritrea in recent years and may view Ethiopia as another potential avenue for gaining influence in the Red Sea. Russia also nominally reached an agreement with the SAF for a Russian naval base in Sudan.
• Burkina Faso. Burkinabe security forces and auxiliary militia conducted another major massacre against civilians. The attack continues a pattern of heightened violence against civilians since the current junta took power in 2022. These abuses exacerbate the ethnic grievances that Salafi-jihadi groups use to recruit.

Assessments:

Democratic Republic of the Congo

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda agreed to a Qatari-mediated ceasefire. DRC President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame met in Doha, Qatar, for a trilateral meeting with Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani on March 18.[1] The parties released a joint communiqué after the meeting announcing an “immediate and unconditional” ceasefire as outlined by East African Community (EAC) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) leaders in early February.[2] Foreign ministers from the EAC-SADC had met the day before the trilateral meeting in Qatar to discuss a “roadmap” to implement the ceasefire.[3] Angola tried and failed to broker a separate ceasefire between pro-Congolese government forces and the Rwandan-backed M23 rebels on March 16.[4]

The joint communiqué from the trilateral meeting stated that the DRC and Rwanda committed to continue informal, Qatari-mediated negotiations and reaffirmed their commitments to the Luanda and Nairobi peace process.[5] The Luanda process is an SADC-backed, Angolan-mediated initiative that aims to broker a peace agreement between the DRC and Rwanda, while the Nairobi process is an EAC-backed, Kenyan-mediated, inter-Congolese dialogue between the DRC government and armed groups in the eastern DRC, including M23. French media reported that France and Qatar have tried separately to mediate talks between the DRC and Rwanda since 2023.[6] Qatar has close economic and diplomatic ties to the DRC and Rwanda, and French media reported that the DRC and Rwanda likely view Qatar as “a mediator with no hidden agenda.”[7]

The DRC and Rwanda released separate readouts after the Doha meeting that highlight that fundamental disagreements remain unresolved. The DRC reiterated its demands for all parties to observe a UN resolution from February that demanded the immediate withdrawal of all Rwandan troops on Congolese soil.[8] Kagame claimed in an interview with CNN in late January that “he doesn’t know” if Rwandan troops are deployed in the eastern DRC.[9] The United Nations has reported that Rwanda has deployed at least 4,000 soldiers to the eastern DRC, while Reuters has reported that Rwandan troop numbers may have surged to 12,000 personnel amid the latest M23 offensives.[10] Rwanda released a statement after the meeting in Doha that reiterated its security concerns over the presence of anti-Tutsi armed groups in the eastern DRC—a pretext Rwanda has used to justify past military interventions in the DRC.[11] Rwanda previously agreed in 2024 to withdraw its troops from the eastern DRC in exchange for the DRC dismantling anti-Tutsi armed groups as part of Luanda process negotiations.[12] This proposed compromise collapsed in December 2024 after Rwanda insisted that the DRC “hold a direct dialogue with the M23” for talks to continue.[13] The specific details of the March 18 Doha ceasefire agreement remain undisclosed.

The DRC-Rwanda talks in Qatar came after M23 unilaterally withdrew from Angolan-mediated negotiations with the DRC in retaliation for EU sanctions against Rwandan and M23 officials.[14] The European Union sanctioned five Rwandan officials, four M23 leaders, and a gold refinery in Kigali, Rwanda’s capital, on March 17.[15] M23 accused the European Union of “obstructing the much-anticipated talks” in Angola and claimed that “successive sanctions” from Western countries “severely undermined direct dialogue and made any progress impossible.”[16] Rwanda on the same day severed diplomatic ties with Belgium, which has been one of Rwanda’s biggest critics and a leading voice for strong EU action against Rwanda for supporting M23.[17]

The DRC, Rwanda, and M23 will likely remain open to short-term ceasefires, as they seek to reset and set conditions for future offensives. Both the Congolese army (FARDC) and M23 have used previous pauses in fighting to reset militarily and launch new offensives. The United Nations reported that FARDC and M23 exploited a lull in fighting to “reinforce troops and replenish weaponry” following a July 2024 ceasefire between the DRC and Rwanda.[18] FARDC has used military stalemates to consolidate its forces and mount counteroffensives, including in October 2022, October 2023, and January 2025.[19] M23 continued to seize territory and relocate troops after it relinquished control of Kibumba town in North Kivu as part of an EAC-brokered ceasefire in December 2022.[20] The group’s activities during the brief ceasefire helped it then capture the operationally significant town of Kitchanga in February 2023.[21] M23 continued to advance toward the South Kivu provincial capital of Bukavu in early February 2025 after declaring a unilateral ceasefire.[22]Corneille Nangaa--head of M23’s political branch--told Reuters that the Qatari-brokered ceasefire “doesn’t concern us” on March 20.[23]

African-led peace efforts continue to suffer from regional rivalries and mutual distrust between the belligerents and mediators in the eastern DRC conflict. A diplomatic source told Reuters that the Qatari-mediated discussions were “informal” and “not meant to replace” the existing Luanda and Nairobi peace processes.[24] The EAC-SADC bloc presented plans in March to merge the two processes after it named three former African heads of state to facilitate the merger.[25]The Qatari foreign ministry stated that the DRC and Rwanda committed to finding a longer-term peace solution through the “now merged and/or aligned” Luanda and Nairobi processes after the Doha meeting.[26] It remains unclear, however, whether the DRC will neg...
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