China-Taiwan Weekly Update, March 21, 2025

Data Cutoff: March 18, 2025

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update is a joint product from the Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute. The update supports the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, which assesses Chinese campaigns against Taiwan, examines alternative strategies for the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) aggression, and—if necessary—defeat the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways  

• Taiwan. Taiwanese President William Lai Ching-te announced 17 measures to counter PRC coercion and malign influence targeting the Taiwanese government, military, and people. His political opponents criticized these measures and downplayed the threat that the PRC poses.
• Taiwan. The Taiwanese legislature rejected a motion from the executive branch to reconsider major government budget cuts. These cuts would severely undermine Taiwan’s ability to resist PRC threats and coercion.
• China. The PRC is developing barges with extendable piers, highlighting its growing amphibious military capabilities. These barges are similar to the “mulberries” that Allied forces used in the amphibious assault on Normandy in World War II.
• North Korea. North Korea is trying to increase its economic and media cooperation with the PRC. This comes as Russia and Ukraine may agree to a ceasefire, which could, in turn, reduce how much military assistance Russia is buying from North Korea.
• Latin America. PRC state media condemned a Hong Kong-based firm’s sale of ports around the Panama Canal to a US company. The PRC may view the port sales as weakening its influence around Panama and Latin America by extension.
• Iran. The PRC, Russia, and Iran issued a joint statement effectively condemning the US “maximum pressure” policy vis-a-vis Iran. The statement reflects the PRC effort to internationally frame the United States as an aggressor and itself as a peaceful mediator.
• Yemen. A conflict monitoring group found PRC-made hydrogen fuel cells en route to the Houthis in Yemen. These fuel cells could be used to enhance Houthi drone capabilities, which would further increase the threat that the Houthis pose to international shipping.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

Taiwanese President William Lai Ching-te announced 17 measures to counter growing national security threats posed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Lai’s rhetoric and increased focus on counter-coercion efforts reflect his concerns about PRC infiltration and malign influence within Taiwanese society and government.[1] Lai identified the five largest threats facing Taiwan as PRC infringement on Taiwanese sovereignty, infiltration and espionage within the Taiwanese military, efforts to erode Taiwanese national identity, United Front influence through cross-strait exchanges, and efforts to coopt Taiwanese businesspeople and youth through economic engagement — during a national security meeting on March 13. Lai’s seventeen measures to combat these threats included a recommendation for Taiwan’s military to restore the military trial system, allowing military judges to collaborate with judicial authorities in criminal cases involving active-duty personnel accused of treason and otherwise aiding Taiwan’s enemies. Forty-three Taiwanese military officers have been accused of spying for the PRC. The Taiwanese National Defense Ministry confirmed the most recent espionage accusation against a Taiwanese Air Force officer on March 12.[2] Lai likely intends to increase military discipline and discourage disloyalty through the proposed re-establishment of the military trial system. PRC espionage efforts pose a major threat to Taiwanese military readiness and risk instilling a sense of mistrust of the military within Taiwan’s populace.

Lai introduced additional anti-coercion measures focused on reducing PRC influence promulgating through information operations and cross-strait exchanges and economic initiatives. These recommendations aim to reduce the effectiveness of PRC United Front influence and information operations and communicate the dangers of engagement to Taiwanese people. The PRC frequently uses economic measures to build stronger cross-strait ties and inculcate positive feelings about cross-strait collaboration within the Taiwanese populace. Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) spokesperson Chen Binhua announced on March 12 the most recent policy measures for the cross-strait Integration and Development zone focused on providing opportunities and incentives for Taiwanese businesses to operate in the PRC.[3]

Opposition Kuomintang (KMT) politicians criticized Lai’s counter-coercion measures, characterizing Lai’s actions as political manipulation and downplaying the risks of cross-strait exchanges. KMT politicians accused Lai of manipulating narratives against his political opponents under the guise of protecting national security and placing Taiwan in a “quasi-war state.”[4] The KMT stated that, by identifying all cross-strait exchanges as opportunities for United Front work, Lai was infringing upon freedom of speech and economic opportunity and making baseless accusations against Taiwanese nationals with ties to the PRC. The KMT has facilitated discussions between Taiwan and the PRC since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cut ties with the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) during the Tsai administration. KMT legislators accused Lai of being too militaristic and provocative, repeating established narratives portraying the KMT as a force for peace with the PRC and the DPP as the party of war.[5]

Lai likely views any cross-strait exchange as an opportunity for the PRC to conduct United Front work, introducing positive sentiments about the PRC and CCP into Taiwanese discourse. CCP infiltration threatens the legitimacy of Taiwanese institutions and could weaken public support for the government.

The PRC conducted military drills near Taiwan on March 17. The PRC Foreign Affairs Ministry framed them as a protest against the US State Department’s removal of the phrase “we do not support Taiwan independence” from one of its fact sheets. Taiwan’s National Defense Ministry observed 59 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft sorties around Taiwan, 43 of which crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait, and nine PLA Navy (PLAN) ships. The ministry reported the highest single-day sortie numbers since the Joint Sword-2024B exercises in October 2024. PRC Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said that the deletion of the phrase “we do not support Taiwan independence” from the fact sheet sent “wrong signals to Taiwan separatist forces,” requiring a “resolute response” to Taiwanese separatist forces and their allies.[6] The United States made this revision on February 16. PRC officials immediately criticized the change and warned Taiwan against seeking independence.[7] The United States maintains its long-standing position of preserving peace and stability in the region, opposing “any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side,” according to the State Department, so there has been no official policy change accompanying the fact sheet revision.[8] The PRC is conducting the military exercise likely to pressure the US State Department to undo the revision. The United States attempted a similar change but reversed course after pushback from the PRC in 2022.[9] This exercise foll...
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