Iran Update March 25, 2025
Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Kelly Campa, Andie Parry, Carolyn Moorman, Annika Ganzeveld, Ben Rezaei, Siddhant Kishore, Avery Borens, Alexis Thomas, and Brian Carter
Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET
The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.
Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.
We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Top Iranian officials reportedly authorized Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi to "advance any diplomatic initiative in relation to the United States," according to an Iranian expert close to the regime.[1] It is not clear who precisely authorized Araghchi to begin “any diplomatic initiative,” but Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei would almost certainly make such a decision. Araghchi has historically taken a softer line on nuclear negotiations with the United States compared to the regime’s hardline elements. Araghchi said on March 24 that Iran is open to indirect talks with the United States “through various channels,” though it rejects direct negotiations.[2] Former President Hassan Rouhani and former leading member of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team Mohammad Javad Zarif were previously given "full authority" to advance nuclear talks during the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action negotiations.[3]
An expected announcement of Syrian President Ahmed al Shara’s cabinet and ministerial appointments will signal how and if Shara intends to extend his personal authority within the executive branch. Shara announced on March 25 that the interim government will comprise 22 ministerial portfolios led by a majority of “newcomers,” suggesting that he will replace the 22 existing ministers.[4] This likely includes dissolving the office of Prime Minister Mohammed al Bashir.[5] Emirati media reported in late February that Shara’s ministerial changes are imminent and are supposed to reflect that Shara understands the concerns about his consolidation of power.[6] This follows widespread concern over Shara’s concentration of executive authority and the lack of checks and balances on the Presidency outlined in the recently announced constitutional declaration.[7]
Shara’s current roster of transitional ministers is nearly entirely composed of bureaucrats that formerly served in the Idlib-based, HTS-controlled Syrian Salvation Government (SSG).[8] At least 18 of the 22 ministers that Shara appointed shortly after coming to power in December 2024 have close ties to or deep experience working with Shara, either through the SSG or through direct participation in HTS.[9] The SSG was nominally independent of HTS but, in practice, subordinate to HTS. Men who have been deeply loyal to Shara and have worked with him since his Jabhat al Nusra days currently hold the largest and highest priority ministerial portfolios, including foreign affairs and intelligence.[10]
Shara’s appointments in the coming days will be a strong indicator of the sort of government and state Shara intends to lead. A bias towards non-SSG, non-Sunni, non-Islamist, and non-HTS backgrounds would indicate Shara’s willingness to form a representative government that represents all of Syria. An opposite bias towards Sunni Arabs, Sunni Islamists, or former HTS and SSG member...
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