Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 1, 2025
Angelica Evans, Daria Novikov, Nicole Wolkov, Davit Gasparyan, Anna Harvey, Karolina Hird, and George Barros with William Runkel and Nate Trotter
April 1, 2025, 5:45pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 10:30 am ET on April 1. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 2 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russian forces are reportedly continuing to shell Ukrainian energy infrastructure amid ongoing negotiations over details of the ceasefire agreement on energy infrastructure strikes, indicating that Russia may be exploiting the ceasefire's vague or unfinalized terms to strike Ukrainian energy infrastructure with shorter-range artillery, but not longer-range cruise missiles or one-way strike drones. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha and Kherson Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Prokudin stated on April 1 that Russian forces shelled energy infrastructure in Kherson City on the morning of April 1, leaving at least 45,000 Kherson residents without electricity.[1] Sybiha stated on April 1 that Russian forces have recently violated the energy infrastructure ceasefire several times.[2] The ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes is reportedly a moratorium on long-range strikes, but it remains unclear whether the moratorium's terms prohibit striking energy infrastructure with shorter-range tube or rocket artillery.[3] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 11 that Ukraine proposed a "temporary ceasefire in the sky" that would include "missile, bomb, and long-range drone" strikes.[4] US, Ukrainian, and Russian officials reached some agreements for a temporary ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure on March 25 but not provide details on whether the ceasefire is exclusively limited to longer-range weapons.[5] Russian forces will likely continue to leverage their positions along the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River and other frontline areas to shell and destroy Ukrainian energy infrastructure in near rear areas unless the energy infrastructure ceasefire includes provisions against such shelling. Russian shelling against Ukrainian energy infrastructure violates the spirit of the ceasefire and US President Donald Trump's intention to utilize the energy infrastructure ceasefire as a confidence-building measure to work towards a general ceasefire in the future. Ukrainian, Russian, and US officials have yet to formalize the ceasefire or present its exact terms.
Senior Russian officials continue to reiterate the Russian demand for the elimination of the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine as a precondition for a peace agreement — a reference to Russia's initial war demands that directly contradict US President Donald Trump's goal to achieve a lasting peace in Ukraine. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on April 1 that the Trump administration is attempting "some kind of scheme" to first achieve a ceasefire and then move to "other models and schemes" to end the war.[6] Ryabkov further claimed that the Trump administration's plan to resolve the war in Ukraine does not address the "root causes" of the war and that Russia, therefore, cannot accept the US proposal. Senior Russian officials have repeatedly defined these root causes as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and Ukraine's alleged violations of the rights of Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine.[7] The Kremlin's demands to address these so-called "root causes" amount to a demand for the full capitulation of Ukraine with the installation of a pro-Russian government in Ukraine and long-term commitments of Ukrainian neutrality — the same demands Putin has made since before the full-scale invasion in February 2022.[8] Russian President Vladimir Putin recently intensified efforts to portray the current Ukrainian government as illegitimate and unable to engage in negotiations to end the war in Ukraine in an effort to undermine Ukraine's role as a legitimate participant in discussions about the resolution of the war.[9] Putin and Russian diplomats made thinly veiled demands in late March 2025 for regime change in Ukraine by having external parties establish a “temporary international administration” in Ukraine under the auspices of the United Nations (UN).[10] US Department of State Spokesperson Tammy Bruce stated on March 31 that Trump did not appreciate Russia's suggestion to establish a "temporary administration" in Ukraine.[11] Bruce also noted that Trump understands that negotiations will "require both Russia and Ukraine to make tough decisions and compromises." Russia has so far refused to make any concessions and rejected the US-Ukrainian 30-day general ceasefire when Trump called Putin on March 18.
Russian forces are expanding their bridgehead northeast of Lyman as part of a mutually reinforcing effort to create conditions for the seizure of Borova and Lyman in the coming months. Footage published on March 28 and geolocated on April 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Novolyubivka (northeast of Lyman) and likely seized Novolyubivka itself.[12] Russian forces recently made confirmed advances southeast of Nove (west of Novolyubivka), and Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on March 31 that Russian forces advanced to the southern outskirts of Katerynivka (northwest of Novolyubivka).[13] Russian forces advanced across the Zherebet...
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