Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 2, 2025
Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Daria Novikov, Anna Harvey, and George Barros with Nate Trotter and William Runkel
April 2, 2025, 6:15 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45 am ET on April 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 3 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russian officials are continuing to exploit the temporary energy infrastructure ceasefire's vague or unfinalized terms. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 2 that the temporary energy infrastructure ceasefire is in effect and that Russia is adhering to the ceasefire.[1] Peskov claimed that Ukraine has "not joined" the temporary ceasefire "essentially" and that Russia intends to discuss this with the United States. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on April 1 that Russia forwarded a list of Ukraine's alleged ceasefire violations to US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the United Nations (UN), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).[2] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 2 that Ukrainian forces are "systematically" conducting drone and artillery strikes against Russian energy infrastructure.[3] The exact contours of the temporary energy infrastructure ceasefire remain unclear, and Ukraine and Russia do not appear to have formally agreed on the list of objects covered in the ceasefire or the types of strikes prohibited. ISW previously noted that it is unclear if the temporary ceasefire prohibits striking energy infrastructure with shorter-range tube or rocket artillery.[4] It is also unclear how Ukraine could violate a temporary ceasefire that it has "not joined."
US officials reportedly continue to acknowledge Russian President Vladimir Putin's unwillingness to commit to a general ceasefire in Ukraine. Two US officials familiar with the matter told Reuters on April 1 that senior Trump administration officials have discussed the likelihood that the United States will not be able to secure a long-term peace agreement in Ukraine in the coming months and are preparing new plans to pressure Russia and Ukraine into an agreement.[5] The sources noted that Trump administration officials acknowledged that Putin is actively resisting US efforts to accomplish a peace agreement in Ukraine and used a series of meetings and calls over the weekend of March 29-30 to discuss possible mechanisms to bring Russia to the negotiating table. A senior US official stated that the Trump administration is considering levying additional tariffs and sanctions against Russia. Another source familiar with the discussions similarly told Fox News on April 1 that US President Donald Trump believes that Putin is "slow-rolling" negotiations on a general ceasefire in Ukraine and that the Trump administration is considering increasing sanctions against Russia in order to force Putin to the negotiating table.[6] Trump recently told NBC News that he is considering additional sanctions against Russian oil and stated during a press conference on March 30 that there is an unspecified "psychological deadline" for Russia to agree to a general ceasefire agreement.[7] ISW previously noted that it is not possible for the United States or the wider West to exert maximum pressure against Russia with economic tools alone as Russia's ongoing and forecasted future economic struggles are closely tied to Russian military losses on the battlefield.[8] The United States can leverage Russian vulnerabilities and achieve a stronger negotiating position by continuing — or increasing — military aid to Ukraine such that Ukrainian forces can continue to inflict significant manpower and materiel losses on Russia.
CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev will reportedly meet with US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff in Washington, D.C. on April 2. Unnamed US officials and other unspecified sources familiar with Dmitriev's trip told CNN on April 1 that Dmitriev will meet with Witkoff later this week in Washington, D.C., and sources told CNN and CBS that the US government temporarily lifted sanctions against Dmitriev in order to grant him a visa to visit the United States.[9] Sources told CBS on April 2 that Dmitriev will meet with Witkoff on April 2, but the Trump administration has not published information about the meeting.[10] It is unclear if the meeting has occurred as of this publication. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 2 that Dmitriev's visit to Washington, D.C. is possible, and Dmitriev inconclusively responded to US reporting on his possible visit with "maybe."[11]
The Russian military command reportedly began reorganizing the motorized rifle brigades of the 51st and 3rd combined arms armies (CAAs) such that each army would have three rifle divisions or motorized rifle divisions, likely in an effort to improve the CAAs' administrative structure, especially over larger numbers of unmechanized riflemen. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on April 2 that the Russian military command may be reorganizing the motorized rifle brigades of the 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 3rd CAA (formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] AC, SMD) such that both armies would have three “motorized” rifle divisions each.[12] The 51st CAA currently includes six motorized rifle brigades on paper: the 1st, 5th, 9th, 110th, 114th, and 132nd motorized rifle brigades. The 3rd CAA also includes six motorized rifle brigades on paper: the 4th, 6th, 7th, 85th, 88th, and 123rd motorized rifle brigades. Mashovets stated that some unspecified brigades in the 51st and 3rd CAAs are already staffed at levels significantly higher than a typical brigade, at least on paper.[13] Mashovets noted that the brigades are already operating at the fr...
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