China-Taiwan Weekly Update, April 4, 2025

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, April 4, 2025

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Alison O’Neil, Karina Wugang, and Frank Mattimoe of the Institute for the Study of War;

Alexis Turek and Alex Chou of the American Enterprise Institute

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Nicholas Carl of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: April 2, 2025

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update is a joint product from the Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute. The update supports the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, which assesses Chinese campaigns against Taiwan, examines alternative strategies for the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) aggression, and—if necessary—defeat the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways  

• Taiwan. Eight cases to recall legislators from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) advanced to the second stage. The mass recall campaigns against Taiwanese legislators have to this point only affected the KMT-led opposition coalition. Most of the recalls targeting the DPP will likely fail, however.
• China. The PRC published an article framing Taiwanese President Lai and his DPP as authoritarian oppressors. This framing is part of an information operation to discredit and undermine PRC critics in the Taiwanese political space.
• China. The PLA conducted a large-scale joint military exercise around Taiwan simulating a blockade. The PRC is normalizing stock blockade exercises as a regular feature in its coercion toolkit that it executes at a chosen time under the pretext of provocations by ROC President Lai Ching-te’s administration.
• China. The PRC is trying to exploit global dissatisfaction with newly imposed US tariffs to attract foreign investment and build relations with historic American allies, such as Canada, the European Union, Japan, and South Korea.
• China. The PRC placed under review a Hong Kong-based firm’s proposed sale of its Panama ports, among other assets, to a US firm. The PRC may consider the sale a threat to its economic security.
• Japan. Japan announced its first emergency evacuation contingency plan for civilians on its Sakishima Islands off the Taiwanese coast. The PRC criticized the plan, arguing that Japan is framing a hypothetical emergency around Taiwan as a threat to Japanese nationals.
• Philippines. The United States committed to deploy additional missiles systems to the Philippines and enhance bilateral defense industrial cooperation. The system is a ground-based, anti-ship missile that can hit targets up to 100 nautical miles away.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

The Taiwanese Central Election Commission (CEC) advanced eight recall petitions targeting ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) legislators. These are the first petitions against the DPP that have passed the first stage, as all other cases are against the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) and KMT-aligned legislators. The CEC announced on March 28 that eight recall petitions against DPP legislators received signatures from at least one percent of eligible voters in their respective districts, meeting the threshold to move to the next stage. One of these petitions is against the DPP Legislative Caucus Secretary-General Rosalia Wu Tzu-yao.[1] Two other recall petitions against DPP lawmakers failed to get enough signatures, and the CEC is still reviewing petitions against seven other DPP lawmakers. The CEC also referred 19 recall petitions, including 16 against national legislators, to prosecutors for suspected fraud after finding invalid signatures from non-constituents, deceased individuals, or duplicate signers.[2]

Forty-three recall cases have advanced to the second stage at this point. The eight DPP recall cases join 34 recall cases against KMT legislators and one against a KMT-aligned independent legislator. The second stage of the recall process requires signatures from at least 10 percent of eligible voters in the targeted legislators’ district within 60 days to trigger a recall election. A special election to fill the vacancy will occur upon a successful recall.[3] Most of the recalls are likely to fail in the second stage as it requires 10 times the number of signatures compared to the first stage. The difficulty that the KMT has had in gathering signatures against DPP legislators from just one percent of their constituency for the first stage illustrates that the mass recalls are likely to benefit the DPP. The DPP must flip at least six seats in the Legislative Yuan to gain a majority.

DPP politicians and DPP-aligned activists initiated the recall campaigns after the KMT passed controversial budget cuts that would undermine many government functions and Taiwanese military readiness as well as a bill that functionally paralyzed the Taiwanese Constitutional Court. The paralysis of the Constitutional Court prevents the DPP from legally contesting the controversial budget cuts. The KMT responded with recall campaigns against the DPP politicians, which until now have failed to garner enough valid signatures to clear the first stage. Recalls have become increasingly common in Taiwan over the past decade after reforms to the Public Officials Election and Recall Act in 2016 made recall thresholds more attainable, and public discourse is increasingly concerned about the political weaponization of recalls.[4]

A Taipei District Court sentenced three former Presidential Office guards and a military communications officer to prison on March 26 for selling military intelligence to the People’s Republic of China (PRC).[5] These sentences highlight the PRC emphasis on infiltrating the Taiwanese military to gather intelligence and undermine the government. The PRC paid the officers up to 2 million New Taiwan Dollars (approximately 60,000 US dollars) for the information that they provided.[6] The court did not specify wha...
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