China-Taiwan Weekly Update, April 11, 2025
Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Alison O’Neil, Karina Wugang, Alfred Han, Olivia Gibson, and Kiley Pittman of the Institute for the Study of War;
Alexis Turek, Yeji Chung, and Alex Chou of the American Enterprise Institute
Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Nicholas Carl of the American Enterprise Institute
Data Cutoff: April 9, 2025
The China–Taiwan Weekly Update is a joint product from the Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute. The update supports the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, which assesses Chinese campaigns against Taiwan, examines alternative strategies for the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) aggression, and—if necessary—defeat the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) raised tariffs on the United States from 34 percent to 125 percent and imposed export controls on seven critical minerals that are essential to the US defense industry. The PRC was retaliating for the United States increasing tariffs on the PRC. These export controls encompass seven materials with extensive military applications. The United States cannot produce the designated minerals at a sufficient scale and exempted them from tariffs in recognition of their importance. The PRC accounted for approximately 70 percent of US rare earth imports from 2020 to 2023 and approximately 70 percent of world mine production of rare earths in 2024. The PRC is leveraging this global dominance to coerce the United States.[1] The PRC Ministry of Commerce stated that the PRC “will fight to the end” and described the US threat of additional tariffs as “blackmail.” This came after the PRC imposed additional export controls against the United States acquiring other critical materials in December 2024 and February 2025 in response to US trade measures.[2]
The PRC is trying to exploit US tariffs and global financial uncertainty to strengthen its economic relationships abroad, including with traditional US partners. PRC President Xi Jinping will meet Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez on April 11. Prime Minister Sanchez previously said that the European Union should increase cooperation with the PRC and have Spain mediate.[3] Separately, PRC Premier Li Qiang held a phone call with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on April 9.[4] This European engagement came after the PRC took part in a rare economic dialogue with Japan and South Korea on March 30 to discuss expanding trade cooperation.
Xi will visit southeast Asia, including Vietnam, on April 14.[5] Vietnam notably hosted the Spanish prime minister on April 9.
The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) revoked the membership of senior military disciplinary officer Tang Yong on March 26.[6] Tang is the deputy secretary of the Central Military Commission (CMC) Discipline Inspection Commission, indicating that his revoked CPPCC membership is related to PRC President Xi’s ongoing efforts to increase the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) loyalty to the party. The CPPCC is a political advisory body comprised of CCP-affiliated elites across society. Revoking CPPCC membership is often the first step in the demotion or discipline of a party member. The next steps are often removing the member from their post and revoking their CCP membership. The CMC is the highest military decision-making body. The CMC Discipline Inspection Commission is the CMC disciplinary and investigation agency.
The CPPCC possibly revoked Tang’s membership as punishment for his perceived failure in his supervisory duties. The PRC has investigated and replaced several senior PLA political commissars in recent months, likely due to Xi’s dissatisfaction with the state of political loyalty in the PLA. The CMC suspended Miao Hua from his post as Political Work Department director in November 2024. This position is the senior-most political commissar in the PLA, carrying ultimate responsibility for instilling loyalty within the PLA to Xi and the CCP. Miao is under investigation for suspected “serious violations of discipline,” which the PRC usually uses to describe officials who are corrupt or deemed disloyal. The CMC later replaced the political commissar for the PLA Ground Forces in December 2024.[7] Recent rumors have claimed that there is another investigation into CMC Vice Chairman He Weidong, who has been absent from the public eye in recent weeks.
Xi has directly tied the PLA’s modernization goals to strengthening the military’s political education.[8] This doctrine promotes the notion that Xi’s organizational reforms of the PLA, the orientation of the CCP around Xi, and the emphasis on the CCP’s strict control of the PLA are necessary to strengthen the PLA as a fighting force. The PRC issued directives in February that strengthened oversight of military-related publications after multiple PLA-affiliated organizations published articles in December 2024 that emphasized tenets of collective leadership and intra-party democracy, which are contrary to Xi’s doctrine of central control.[9]
The South Korean Constitutional...
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