Iran Update, April 14, 2025
Alexandra Braverman, Ben Rezaei, Andie Parry, Kelly Campa, Katherine Wells, Carolyn Moorman, Siddhant Kishore, Johanna Moore, Avery Borens, and Annika Ganzeveld
Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET
The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.
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Iran and the United States held nuclear talks in Muscat, Oman, on April 12.[1] The Iranian delegation, which was led by Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, presented Iran’s demands and red lines to the US delegation, which was led by US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff. The Iranian demands include sanctions relief guarantees, access to billions of dollars of frozen Iranian assets, and an end to the US maximum pressure campaign targeting Iranian oil exports to China, according to Iranian and Arab officials.[2] It would be very difficult for the United States to guarantee permanent sanctions relief, given that such a requirement would have to span multiple US presidential administrations. The issue of guaranteeing sanctions relief was a point of contention between Iran and the United States under the Biden administration.[3] Araghchi emphasized that Iran will not agree to completely dismantle its nuclear program.[4] Unspecified Iranian officials told the Wall Street Journal on April 12 that Iran would be willing to reduce its uranium enrichment to 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) levels, however.[5] The JCPOA limited Iranian uranium enrichment to 300 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride enriched up to 3.67 percent for fifteen years.[6]
It is unclear if Iran would agree to dismantle its advanced centrifuges in addition to reducing its current stockpile of enriched uranium. Iran has installed advanced centrifuges at its main nuclear facilities—Natanz and Fordow—in recent years. These advanced centrifuges have increased the rate at which Iran can enrich uranium. Iran currently has 274.8 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium, which is enough uranium, if enriched further, to produce around six nuclear weapons.[7]
It is unclear whether Iran seeks to return to the JCPOA in its current format. The JCPOA contains various restrictions on the Iranian nuclear program that will expire in 2030. These restrictions are referred to as “sunset provisions.” It is unclear, if Iran were to agree to return to the JCPOA, whether the sunset provisions would renew for an additional 15 years. It is also unclear whether Iran would agree to a new nuclear deal that included permanent restrictions on the Iranian nuclear program. US President Donald Trump repeatedly criticized the existence of sunset provisions in the JCPOA prior to withdrawing from the agreement in 2018.[8]
Iran could rebuild its nuclear program at a faster pace after the expiration of sunset provisions, or if a new agreement collapses, provided that Iran maintains its current advanced centrifuge technology. Iran has increased its number of operational centrifuges since it signed the JCPOA in 2015.[9] Iran is also developing new advanced centrifuges, such as the IR-8, which Iranian officials have claimed is “sixteen times” more capable than the IR-1 centrifuge.[10] Even if Iran were to agree to downblend its stockpile of enriched uranium, Iran would likely be able to re-enrich this stockpile at a relatively fast pace, compared to before 2015, if it maintains its current advanced centrifuges.
Note: This list is not exhaustive and only includes the main Iranian violations of the JCPOA.[11]
The United States presented its demands and red lines ahead of the nuclear talks on April 12. Witkoff told the Wall Street Journal on April 11 that the United States' “opening demand” would be the dismantlement of the Iranian nuclear program but acknowledged that the United States is open to “find[ing] compromise” with Iran.[12] Witkoff stressed that the United States’ “red line” is preventing Iranian weaponization. Trump similarly stated on April 14 that Iran must abandon the “concept of a nuclear weapon.”[13]
Iranian and US officials presented the April 12 talks as “positive” and “constructive.” Significant...
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