Iran Update, April 16, 2025
Ben Rezaei, Katherine Wells, Kelly Campa, Siddhant Kishore, Alexandra Braverman, Victoria Penza, Avery Borens, Johanna Moore, and Brian Carter
Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET
The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.
Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.
We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Iran is unlikely to accept zero uranium enrichment and full dismantlement of its nuclear program. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on April 16 that uranium enrichment is a “real and undeniable right” and “not subject to negotiation.”[1] Araghchi stated that “contradictory” US positions do not help the negotiations and emphasized that “Iran must hear Washington’s real stance” to assess whether a framework agreement is possible. Araghchi likely referred to recent remarks by US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff regarding "zero uranium enrichment," in which Witkoff originally said Iran could enrich uranium to 3.67 percent before clarifying that any nuclear deal must “stop and eliminate” Iranian nuclear enrichment.[2] Iranian officials have consistently rejected the concept of zero uranium enrichment and stated that Iran may reduce enrichment to Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) levels.[3] Iranian Expediency Discernment Council member and former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Mohsen Rezaei separately stated on X on April 16 that US statements reflect ”confusion and disarray” within the Trump administration and reinforce Iranian distrust caused by the U S withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018.[4] Rezaei’s remarks align with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s guidance in his April 15 speech. Khamenei said Iran must “proceed carefully” in the US-Iran talks and signaled deep skepticism toward the United States while supporting negotiations to mitigate pressure and preserve regime stability.[5] Khamenei will likely remain skeptical of any agreement with the Trump administration, given Trump’s decision to withdraw from the JCPOA.[6]
Senior Iranian officials appear increasingly concerned about a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard visited Fordow Air Defense Group in Qom Province on April 16 to evaluate the unit’s operational readiness.[7] The air defense site, also known as Hazrat-e Masoumeh Air Defense Group, is located approximately 16 km east of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP).[8] Fordow is a highly fortified underground uranium enrichment facility built into a mountain and reportedly designed to withstand military strikes, making it one of Iran’s most secure nuclear sites.[9] Iran previously conducted air defense exercises near the Fordow nuclear facility in January 2025.[10] Sabahi Fard’s visit marks the fourth stop in the ongoing Iranian air defense inspections that began on April 4.[11]
Recent statements by unspecified US officials suggested the reported US drawdown in Syria will decrease US forces to no less than 1,000, roughly the same amount of US forces present in Syria before the recent increase in 2024. An unspecified US official told Reuters on April 15 that the United States may decide to reduce its force presence in Syria by half, which would be consistent with the size of previous ...
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