Iran Update, April 17, 2025
Katherine Wells, Alexandra Braverman, Andie Parry, Ben Rezaei, Kelly Campa, Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman, Avery Borens, Victoria Penza and Annika Ganzeveld
Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET
The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.
Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.
We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Senior Iranian political and military officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, met with Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman in Tehran on April 17. Saudi Arabia may seek to reassure Iran about its positions on a potential strike on Iran and a potential ground offensive against the Houthis in Yemen.[1] Salman’s visit to Iran follows recent statements by senior Iranian officials threatening to attack any base “used by Americans” in a potential strike on Iran.[2] These threats likely seek to discourage US partners in the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia, from supporting an attack on Iran. Iran previously threatened in October 2024 that it would attack Saudi energy infrastructure if Saudi Arabia supported an Israeli attack on Iran.[3] Salman may have sought to reassure Iranian officials that Saudi Arabia would not support an attack on Iran.
Salman, accompanied by Saudi Ambassador to Yemen Mohammed al Jaber, may have also sought to reassure Iran that Saudi Arabia would not support a ground offensive against the Houthis in Yemen.[4] Salman’s visit to Iran follows recent reports that some Gulf countries and anti-Houthi factions in Yemen are exploring the possibility of a Yemeni government ground offensive against the Houthis.[5] Unspecified Saudi officials told Western media on April 14 that Saudi Arabia would not participate in a ground offensive.[6] Iran views the Houthis as an integral part of the Axis of Resistance, particularly since Israel has significantly degraded other key members of the Axis of Resistance, including Hezbollah and Hamas.[7]
A Chinese government-linked satellite company provided intelligence to the Houthis, according to US officials speaking to the Financial Times on April 17.[8] This intelligence could support Houthi attacks against US vessels and commercial shipping, which demonstrates how the Houthis are continuing to cooperate with US adversaries to disrupt global trade. The US government raised concerns to the Chinese government about Chang Guang Satellite Technology Co., Ltd. (CGSTL) providing satellite intelligence to the Houthis.[9] The Chinese government reportedly ignored these concerns. CGSTL has ties to the Chinese military through China’s military-civilian “fusion” program, which aims to integrate private sector work with military research and development, according to research done by a Washington-based security consulting firm.[10] CGSTL’s provision of satellite intelligence to the Houthis is part of ongoing Chinese, Russian, and Iranian support to the Houthis. Houthi-owned military communications and domestic surveillance companies have reportedly imported Chinese-made communications equipment.[11] Iran and Russia have provided targeting intelligence to the Houthis, which aids Houthi attacks on international shipping.[12] The Yemeni coast guard and Omani customs have previously seized shipments of Chinese-made military equipment to the Houthis, such as hydrogen fuel cells for powering missiles and drone propellers.[13] The Houthis reportedly told China and Russia in March 2024 that the Houthis would not target Chinese and Russian-flagged vessels transiting the Red Sea, according to several sources with knowledge on Houthi leadership discussions.
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) deployed an Israeli EL/M-2084 radar at the Emirati B...
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