China-Taiwan Weekly Update, April 18, 2025
Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Alison O’Neil, Karina Wugang, Alfred Han, and Nathan Blustajn of the Institute for the Study of War;
Alexis Turek, Yeji Chung, and Alex Chou of the American Enterprise Institute
Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Nicholas Carl of the American Enterprise Institute
Data Cutoff: April 15, 2025
The China–Taiwan Weekly Update is a joint product from the Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute. The update supports the ISW-AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, which assesses Chinese campaigns against Taiwan, examines alternative strategies for the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s aggression, and—if necessary—defeat the People’s Liberation Army. The update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.
People’s Republic of China (PRC) military officers have visited Russian-held territory in Ukraine and toured the frontlines, according to a former Western official speaking to Reuters.[1] These visits highlight PRC efforts to learn from the Russia-Ukraine war in preparation for modern warfare. PRC military thinkers have previously noted the cost effectiveness of using drones to destroy high-value targets, such as air defense systems, based on their observations from the war.[2] The lessons that the PRC draws from the war will likely inform its doctrine, training, and development of capabilities moving forward.
The PRC has likely already used some of these lessons to develop new counter-drone systems.[3] PRC weapons manufacturer Norinco claimed in its monthly publication that it has built the world’s first close-in, anti-drone barrage system, which it named the Bullet Curtain. The chief engineer of the system claimed that it uses a 4 x 4 array of 35-milimeter barrels to fire a “curtain” to intercept projectiles, such as aircraft, drones, and missiles. The system appears designed to counter swarm attacks in particular. It uses volleys of rapid, overlapping fire and reloads quickly, according to Norinco.[4] The PRC investment in the Bullet Curtain may be in part a response to the reduced effectiveness of electronic warfare against drones in the Russia-Ukraine war, as both sides have developed fiber-optic systems that can resist jamming.[5]
The PRC is emphasizing counter-drone capabilities likely in preparation for the fighting that it would face in a Taiwan invasion scenario. US and Taiwanese concepts for defending the island heavily feature cheap and mobile drones to repel the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). [6] Taiwan has already acquired advanced US drones and plans to produce four domestic systems as well. An unnamed Taiwanese official told the Liberty Times that Taiwan plans to double its production of attack drones in order to turn the Taiwan Strait into a “hellscape” for the PLA. [7] The term “hellscape” refers to US plans to heavily involve drones across all domains to fight the PLA around Taiwan.[8]
The PRC has increased its military cooperation with Russia to improve PLA readiness, further highlighting how Russia is helping the PRC prepare for future wars. The PLA has very little combat experience and struggles to run realistic exercises, which could compromise its readiness. The PLA has accordingly expanded its training with Russia in recent years, particularly to improve interoperability and the realism of exercises.[9] PRC-Russia joint military exercise reached a record high in 2024, highlighting this expanding cooperation.[10]
The PRC has separately provided economic support, including dual-use goods, to Russia throughout the Russia-Ukraine, despite consistently claiming to be an impartial mediator and voice for peace.[11] PRC-Russia economic cooperation has deepened in recent years and spiked in 2024, when bilateral trade reached a record high.[12] The PRC has supplied Russia with 90 percent of legacy chips and 70 percent of machine tools needed to sustain the war in Ukraine. [13] NATO has called the PRC the “decisive enabler” of the Russian war against Ukraine.[14] The PRC support to the Russian defense industry may provide the PRC opportunities to learn about wartime production, including about the types of technologies that Russia is fielding in the war.
Unnamed US officials said that over 100 PRC nationals fighting for Russia are likely mercenaries with no connection to the PRC government. The officials told Reuters that the soldiers have minimal training are unlikely to have a significant impact on Russia’s war effort.[15] The comments follow Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky claiming that Ukraine is aware of 155 PRC nationals fighting in Ukraine and has captured two of them. Zelensky accused Russia of using social media to recruit PRC fighters. The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintained that the PRC government mandates its citizens to avoid conflict zones, however.[16]
North Korea conducted a special operations forces (SOF) exercise, which similarly appeared to incorporate lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un oversaw a SOF exercise on April 4, which involved camouflage operations, including ghillie suits. North Korean state media described the exercise as featuring “adaptations to modern warfare.”[17] The term “modern warfare” in North Korea often refers specifically to the Russia-Ukraine war.[18]
The North Korean emphasis on camouflage may be part of its effort to develop its counter-drone doctrine, which could immediately benefit its soldiers fighting Ukraine. Ukraine has reportedly killed and injured many North Korean soldiers in recent months with drones, likely prompting the North Korean military to explore how to better evade these attacks.[19] The camouflage that the North Korean SOF practiced may be ineffective against Ukrainian motion-detecting and thermal optic drones in wide-open field environments. But the use of camouflage to evade drones could be useful in the event of a war with South Korea, which would occur over more mountainous terrain. Kim’s visit to the exercise coincided with South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s impeachment, indicating that North Korea may be trying to signal its military readiness amid South Korea’s leadership vacuum and subsequent security vulnerabilities.[20]
The PRC may have detained Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice Chairman General He Weidong or removed him from his post. A Chinese Communist Party (CCP) purge of He would indicate that PRC President Xi Jinping’s distrust of the loyalty of the military extends to members of the top brass and his own inner circle. A Newsweek article on March 27 reported rumors that He had been arrested, citing an independent investigative journalist.[21] He subsequently missed a tree-planting event that all other members of the CMC attended on April 2 and was the only Politburo member absent from the Central Confe...
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